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The South China Sea is one of the maritime hot spots in the world and perhaps accounts 
for more clashes than other disputed waters, due to the abundancy of the natural 
resources that can fulfill the region’s rising demand of energy and food. Six countries 
currently claim some or the whole part of the South China Sea: Brunei, China, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all with overlapping claims. 
Although the South China Sea claimant countries have clashes with each other, 
the close proximity of the Philippines and Vietnam to China has contributed the greatest 
number of clashes. The modernization of naval forces in the region, combined with the 
increasing frequency and seriousness of these clashes, suggests that they may escalate to 
the level of military conflict.  
However, in almost every case, the vessels involved are civilian, not military. 
Without coordination and control between those agencies and naval forces from each 
country, there is a risk that those incidents could still escalate into military conflict. This 
condition highlights the importance of civil-military relations; in particular, effective 
coordination between civil and military agencies within each country, and between the 
civilian and military agencies of each party in the dispute. 
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION .................................3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
1. The Danger of Escalation in the South China Sea ............................4 
2. Conceptual Frameworks Regarding Civil–Military 
Cooperation ..........................................................................................6 
3. Different Scholarly Works Define Civil–Military Cooperation ......7 
4. Civil–Military Maritime Agencies Cooperation ...............................9 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ...........................10 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................11 
II. COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MARITIME 
AGENCY COOPERATION .....................................................................................13 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 
B. THE PHILIPPINES.......................................................................................13 
1. The Philippine Navy ..........................................................................14 
2. The Philippine Coast Guard .............................................................15 
3. The National Coast Watch System ...................................................15 
4. Plan ......................................................................................................16 
5. Interagency Institutions, Structures, and Process ..........................16 
6. Resources and Professional Norms ..................................................18 
C. VIETNAM ......................................................................................................21 
1. The Vietnam People’s Navy ..............................................................22 
2. Vietnam Civilian Maritime Agencies ...............................................24 
3. Plan ......................................................................................................26 
4. Interagency Institutions, Structure, and Process ............................26 
5. Resources and Professional Norms ..................................................27 
D. CHINA ............................................................................................................30 
1. The People’s Liberation Army Navy................................................31 
2. Maritime Law Enforcement..............................................................32 
3. Plan ......................................................................................................32 
4. Interagency Institutions, Structure, and Process ............................34 
5. Resources and Professional Norms ..................................................35 
E. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ........................................37 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................40 
III. INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MARITIME AGENCY 
COOPERATION .......................................................................................................43 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................43 
B. THE WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM .................................44 
C. THE NORTH PACIFIC COAST GUARD FORUM .................................46 
 vii 
D. REGIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON COMBATING 
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS IN ASIA ............47 
E. SECURITY COOPERATION UNDER THE ASEAN ..............................48 
1. ASEAN Regional Forum ...................................................................49 
2. ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting and ADMM-Plus ...................50 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................51 
IV. PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES .....................................53 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ..............................53 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE CLAIMS ..................................................................56 
C. TREND OF SKIRMISHES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
DISPUTED AREAS .......................................................................................59 
D. CASE STUDIES .............................................................................................65 
1. The Scarborough Reef Standoff in 2012 ..........................................66 
2. The Oil Rig Incident in 2014 .............................................................68 
E. EFFORTS TO MANAGE THE CONFLICT .............................................69 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................71 
V. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD .............................................................73 
A. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................73 
B. THE WAY AHEAD .......................................................................................78 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................79 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Overlapping Claims in the South China Sea......................................................5 
Figure 2. Philippines Coast Watch System .....................................................................17 
Figure 3. The VPN Regional Commands ........................................................................23 
Figure 4. The VCG Regional Commands .......................................................................25 
Figure 5. China’s First and Second Islands Defense .......................................................34 
Figure 6. Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea According to Agencies 
Involved ...........................................................................................................63 
Figure 7. Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea According to 
Countries Involved ...........................................................................................64 
Figure 8. Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea According to Reasons ...65 
Figure 9. The Scarborough Reef .....................................................................................67 
Figure 10. The Oilrig Incident ...........................................................................................69 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. The Philippines Domestic Civilian and Military Maritime Agency 
Cooperation ......................................................................................................38 
Table 2. Vietnam Domestic Civilian and Military Maritime Agency Cooperation .......39 
Table 3. China Domestic Civilian and Military Maritime Agency Cooperation ...........40 
Table 4. The Comparison of Maritime Cooperation Effectiveness ...............................41 
Table 5. List of Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea after DoC 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADMM  ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation 
CORPAT Coordinated Patrol 
CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea  
DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
INCSEA Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas 
MLE  Maritime Law Enforcement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PCG  Philippine Coast Guard 
PLA  People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PN  Philippine Navy 
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention of the Law on the Sea 
VCG  Vietnam Coast Guard 
VPN  Vietnam People’s Navy 









I want to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisors Dr. Michael Malley, 
for his insights of the Southeast Asia region and discussions that shaped much of my 
research of this thesis, and Florina Cristiana Matei, for her kindness to allow me to use 
her new approach in the civil-military relations studies and valuable comments. I also 
want to express my deepest gratitude to my family: Nia, my dear wife and best friend, 
and Dhika and Lia, our wonderful children, for their enduring support.  
 xv 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The South China Sea, which encompasses three island groups—the Pratas, 
Paracel, and Spratly—and the Scarborough Shoal, is one of the maritime hot spots in the 
world and perhaps accounts for more clashes than other disputed waters, due to the 
abundancy of untapped oil and gas reserves, fisheries, and other minerals in its 
surrounding waters. Six countries currently claim some or the whole part of the South 
China Sea: Negara Brunei Darussalam (Brunei), People’s Republic of China (China), 
Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines (the Philippines), the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
and Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam), all with overlapping claims.1  
Although countries around the South China Sea have agreed to resolve their 
disputes peacefully through the series of negotiations that culminated in the signing of the 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DoC) in 2002, the 
resolution of the problem is difficult, if not impossible.2 To begin with, there are different 
perspectives in asserting rights: United Nations Convention of the Law on the Sea 
(UNCLOS), historical claims, or a combination of both. The regional economy and 
population growth have further raised the competition among the claimants to secure the 
energy and fisheries sources in the South China Sea; if not properly managed, the 
disputes may escalate. Actually, according to statistics, since the signing of the DoC in 
2002, the number of skirmishes over the South China Sea disputes is rising. Those 
clashes involve civilian forces, such as vessels belonging to the coast guards and fisheries 
1 Some argue that the Republic of China (Taiwan) is not a country because it does not have a seat in 
the United Nations (UN). 
2 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” adopted by the Foreign Ministers of 
ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 
November 4, 2002, http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-
of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea. 
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protection agencies, and a combination of civilian and military forces.3 Most current 
skirmishes involve those belonging to the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as China, 
ranging from ship ramming to warning shots.4 In almost every case, the vessels involved 
are civilian, not military. Nevertheless, modernization of naval forces in the region, 
combined with the increasing frequency and seriousness of these clashes, suggests that 
they may escalate to the level of military conflict. Without coordination and control 
between those agencies and naval forces from each country, there is a risk that those 
incidents could escalate into military conflict. For example, the latest ramming incident 
involves Vietnam and China Coast Guard ships; both are civilian agencies, but they are 
backed by naval vessels that may get involved.5 
The high possibility of escalation in the disputed South China Sea highlights the 
importance of civil-military relations; in particular, building effective security 
institutions, for which one requirement is developing civil-military coordination and 
cooperation for regional security.6 The premise of this thesis is that conflict management 
requires effective coordination between civil and military agencies within each country, 
and between the civilian and military agencies of each party to the dispute. This thesis 
will examine the relations between civilian and military agencies that are responsible for 
enforcing the rights that Vietnam and the Philippines claim in the South China Sea. This 
thesis will attempt to answer the question of whether or not a lack of (or limited) civil-
military cooperation—domestically and internationally—has contributed to the recent 
conflicts. The thesis will try to identify the implications of avoiding the escalation of 
these disputes at the domestic and international levels.  
3 The term of clash in this thesis refers to a direct engagement between two or more claimant 
countries’ maritime units. For instance, it may include incidents of ship ramming, water hosing, threatening 
to use force, warning shots, and other harassing methods with the aim to prevent the other party from 
entering into a disputed area. The detailed analysis of empirical data will be presented in Chapter IV of this 
thesis.  
4 “South China Sea Timeline,” Deutsche Welle, last updated October 4, 2013, http://www.dw.de/
south-china-sea-timeline/a-16732585.  
5 Ridzwan Rahmat, “China and Vietnam Square Off in SCS over Oil Rig,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 51, 
no. 20 (May 14, 2014): 16.  
6 The civil-military relations that may be applicable in this regards are civilian control over military 
and its effectiveness. The effectiveness encompasses coordination, resources, and process/ structure. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
There are many studies on China’s claim to the South China Sea, but fewer 
studies about the other countries’ claims. In addition, there are no official mechanisms for 
cooperation among claimants’ civilian and military maritime forces in the South China 
Sea, and there are few studies of how the lack of civil-military cooperation may 
contribute to the escalation. This thesis will attempt to complete the existing literature. It 
will provide an analysis of the two major players: the Philippines and Vietnam. Both 
countries have overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands on the South China Sea and 
significant presence in the disputed waters. It will also link the escalation of conflict with 
the civil–military relations realm. 
The probability of escalation in the South China Sea conflicts becomes a concern 
for many countries, especially in the region. On the one hand, since most regional trade is 
transported by sea, any escalation of the conflict may affect non-claimant countries that 
depend on free navigation such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. On the other hand, the potential of conflict 
may not be limited to the claimant countries only. For instance, even though the United 
States promotes and favors a peaceful resolution in the South China Sea disputes, its 






7 Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea (Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 
14) (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012), 4, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/CPA_contingencymemo_14.pdf. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the literature on four topics that are critical to the thesis: the 
danger of escalation, conceptual frameworks regarding civil-military cooperation, the 
role of civilian and military maritime forces in the South China Sea, and cooperation in 
different regions that could be models for solutions in the South China Sea. 
1. The Danger of Escalation in the South China Sea 
The South China Sea disputes are very difficult to solve; there are large 
differences among countries in justifying their claims and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not been able to prevent conflicts between its members and 
China. Therefore, many analysts are concerned that the disputes can lead to open conflict. 
David Scott explains the complexity of finding a peaceful resolution in the South 
China Sea, because of the different bases of countries’ claims (see Figure 1). Brunei, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam base their claims on the interpretation of the land 
boundaries drawn by colonial powers’ documents and the UNCLOS. While China and 
Taiwan both have identical claims, they have based their claims on historical evidence 
that dates back to ancient times and on the UNCLOS. From all the claimants, Brunei is 
the only country that does not claim sovereignty over territory in the South China Sea; it 
only claims rights to its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ).8 The proximity of the 
Philippines, China, and Vietnam makes the probability of clashes among those countries 
higher than with other claimants.  
8 David Scott, “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea,” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (November/
December 2012), 1034, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.6.1019.   
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Figure 1.  Overlapping Claims in the South China Sea9 
J. N. Mak argues that the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the 
Southeast Asia (TAC), which promotes peaceful resolutions of disputes among member 
countries, cannot prevent clashes in the South China Sea because it only works for land 
territorial disputes. The ASEAN member countries are comfortable with land boundaries 
9 David Rosenberg, ed., “Sovereignty Claims and Agreements in the South China Sea-US DoD, 




                                                 
drawn by colonial powers, but there are no such clear lines on the sea. Therefore, the 
maritime boundaries are still contested and even become militarized by claimant 
countries, complicating the resolutions.10  
Despites the increasing clashes, Sheldon W. Simon points out that the South 
China Sea disputes are often overshadowed by the situation in the Korean Peninsula and 
Taiwan Strait; he argues that it may lead to a conflict, especially after the recent growing 
tensions.11 According to Bruce Russett and John Oneal, the militarized disputes are 30 
times more likely to become open conflict than common wars; they usually start from the 
exchange of warning and rhetoric.12 Contrary to their view that government intentionally 
starts conflict, the maritime disputes may escalate unintentionally.13 Operational 
commanders may react toward another party’s units that already crossed the line or 
defied an accepted norm, according to the country’s interpretation of vague definitions of 
hostile intent and hostile acts. The current trend of building up a presence in the disputed 
areas and persistent clashes between operational units are possible precursors to 
escalation. 
2. Conceptual Frameworks Regarding Civil–Military Cooperation 
Literature on civil–military cooperation places it in the realm of civil–military 
relations. Florina Cristiana Matei argues that civil-military relations involve a trinity of 
democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the security forces (military, 
police, and intelligence).14 In the maritime context, where there is no direct threat of 
praetorianism or a coup d’état, ensuring that the various maritime civilian and military 
10 J. N. Mak, “Sovereignty in ASEAN and the Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China 
Sea,” in Security and International Politics in the South China Sea, eds. Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers 
(Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 110–112.   
11 Sheldon W. Simon, “Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington,” 
Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (November/December 2012), 995, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/
as.2012.52.6.995.  
12 Bruce Russet and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 94. 
13 Ibid., 95. 
14 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil–Military Relations, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 
2012), 26. 
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agencies are able to operate together effectively in the disputed area is the priority. Any 
deviation from the national policy because of any reason may provoke other claimants 
and may bring dire consequences. Therefore, with the various maritime agencies 
involved in the disputed areas, focusing on the effectiveness is more appropriate. Matei 
argues that there are three effectiveness requirements: plan; interagency institutions, 
structure, and process, to include interagency coordination and cooperation, both at 
domestic and international levels; and resources.15 In terms of Matei’s framework, each 
claimant needs to create a national maritime doctrine or strategy jointly promulgated by 
all stakeholders; to have a coordinating body for managing inter-agency cooperation, 
domestically and internationally; and to assign resources to the security forces, which can 
be in the form of equipment such as communication devices or human capital such as 
professional personnel. The biggest challenge is to make all agencies work together and 
set aside rivalries among them. 
3. Different Scholarly Works Define Civil–Military Cooperation 
A different body of literature deals with the relevance of Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) in international operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) doctrine of the CIMIC highlighted the importance of cooperation between 
military and civilian agencies, incorporating national and international actors.16 The 
change of operational environment and the spectrum of threats have placed civilian and 
military organizations in the overlapping responsibilities in such a way that they need to 
cooperate in order to achieve success.17 The doctrine provides some framework in 
conflict prevention and crisis management.  
Thomas R. Mockaitis elaborates on the complexity of operational environments 
and various actors involved in the CIMIC through his case studies of NATO’s experience 
15 Ibid. Thus, Matei’s framework directly links civil–military cooperation and coordination with the 
civil–military relations framework. 
16 AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine (June 2003), 1-1, http://www.nato.int/
ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf.  
17 Ibid., 2-1. 
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in Kosovo.18 He explains the significance and challenges of civil-military cooperation 
during NATO’s Kosovo operation.19 Similar to the NATO approach, Pascu Furnica 
proposes the European Security Institutions’ civil-military relations in peace operations in 
order to overcome the differences among agencies.20  
Other bodies of literature note the challenges to civil-military cooperation. Volker 
Franke describes the difficulties in civil-military cooperation such as the cultural, 
organizational, operational, and normative differences among those agencies.21 He 
proposes a solution to the dilemma by identifying factors that affect civil-military 
cooperation.22 Franke identifies various civilian actors in civil-military cooperation, such 
as “international organizations (IOs), including UN agencies, or international, regional, or 
local non-governmental organizations (NGOs).”23 Furthermore, he concludes that the 
military’s main role in the CIMIC is to provide security to aid and civil institutions.24 He 
also points out that there are difficulties: there are limited opportunities to train civilians 
and military in the CIMIC, and they have different procedures and organizational 
cultures.25 
Although Franke discusses CIMIC in the stability operations context, the same 
problems arise in other civil-military cooperation in the maritime realm. Hence, the 
specialization of each agency ultimately will contribute to the mission’s success, 
provided they can resolve the differences, especially regarding the leading and supporting 
agency.  
18 Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2004), v, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub583.pdf.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Pascu Furnica, “Civil-Military Relations in European Security Institutions–Challenges of Multi-
Institutionality in Peace Operations” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).  
21 Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” 
International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2006), 9–17, www.gmu.edu/academic/
ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Ibid., 9–10. 
25 Ibid., 7–8.  
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4. Civil–Military Maritime Agencies Cooperation  
Maritime cooperation is not a new concept and it has been adopted since the Cold 
War era. However, it is mainly with the same type of agencies, such as military or 
civilian, and it is not always successful. Therefore, there are proposals to expand the 
cooperation into multi-agencies. 
Glaser explains some kinds of the maritime cooperation that was intended to ease 
tension and prevent escalation, such as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) 
between the United States and the Soviet Union that was promulgated in 1988. Although 
there were some difficulties in implementation, the communication between potential 
belligerents proved successful in decreasing the probability of escalation.26 
Glaser also proposes cooperation modelled after the North Pacific Coast Guard 
Forum (NPCGF), initiated by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to enhance interoperability 
among coast guards.27 Focusing on sharing information, law enforcement, and safety of 
navigation, the forum currently consists of six member countries: Canada, China, Japan, 
Korea, Russia, and the United States.28  
There are some examples of maritime cooperation among countries that share 
maritime boundaries, but it doesn’t seem to work very well in contested areas. For 
example, the Coordinated Patrol (Corpat) conducted in the Strait of Malacca between 
Indonesian and Malaysian navies has been successful in reducing illegal activities near 
both countries’ agreed-upon maritime border. Nevertheless, when it comes to the 
overlapping of Indonesia’s EEZ and Malaysia’s continental shelf claim in the area, some 
minor incidents still happen, as in the case of a Malaysian helicopter intervention when 
an Indonesian Ministry of Fisheries Affairs ship apprehended two Malaysian fishing 
boats.29 However, more serious incidents such as ship ramming and threats to use force 
26 Glaser, Armed Clash, 4. 
27 Ibid.; “North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum,” Canadian Coast Guard, last modified June 24, 
2013, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/e0007869. 
28 “North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum,” Canadian Coast Guard. 
29 I Made Andi Arsana, “Understanding the Malacca Strait Incident,” Jakarta Post, April 14, 2011, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/14/understanding-malacca-strait-incident.html.  
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occurred in Ambalat waters, east of Borneo, where both Indonesia and Malaysia have 
overlapping territorial claims; only by intensive diplomatic talks and more restrictive 
rules of engagement was the situation eased.30 
James Goldrick advocates the Western Pacific Naval Symposium’s (WPNS’s) 
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to avoid incidents and unnecessary 
provocations in the disputed areas as it could be used as guidance for inexperienced 
operational commanders; but the problem is that currently this code only applies to 
military ships and aircraft.31 All navies of the South China Sea claimant countries are 
members of WPNS. If the cooperation could be extended to the various civilian maritime 
agencies—or placed under a new organization, it could have a great impact on the 
prevention of escalation in the areas of maritime disputes.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are many overlapping interests in the South China Sea disputes; therefore, 
it is very difficult to make a consensus among claimants. While there are talks among the 
leaders of the claimant countries to resolve disputes without resorting to the use of force, 
there are still difficulties in implementing solutions in the field, as shown by various 
skirmishes. The number of maritime agencies operating in the same area, different 
procedures, professionalism, communication, and the distance from the mainland all 
contribute to the recent clashes. Nevertheless, we can prevent the escalation of disputes 
into open conflict and pave the way to a peaceful settlement. Focusing on the 
effectiveness of the civil-military relations trinity, my hypothesis is that the lack of civil-
military cooperation domestically and among claimant states increases the probability of 
skirmishes and conflict escalation. 
30 Amir Tejo, “Navy Was Set to Fire on Warship,” Jakarta Globe, June 4, 2009, 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/navy-was-set-to-fire-on-warship/277953/; “Malaysian Navy Chief 
Apologizes for Actions in Ambalat,” Jakarta Post, June 10, 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/
2009/06/10/malaysian-navy-chief-apologizes-actions-ambalat.html.  
31 James Goldrick, “Cue Co-operation? Pacific Naval Code Aims to Improve Collaboration at Sea,” 
Jane’s Defense Weekly 51, no. 21 (May 21, 2014), 24–25. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
I will compare the Philippines and Vietnam to analyze the proposed thesis 
question because they are the two most prominent actors in the South China Sea disputes 
besides China. I will not discuss other claimants in depth because of the relatively few 
incidents involving those countries and the limitation of research.  
I am interested in comparing the cooperation of various civilian and military 
maritime agencies in the Philippines and Vietnam because most of the recent skirmishes 
in the South China Sea involve both countries’ vessels. China is included in the domestic 
civilian and military maritime agencies’ comparison because it is the central actor in the 
disputes. China’s claim is the biggest among other countries, as it encompasses almost 
the whole South China Sea. Its maritime assets also account for most clashes with other 
claimants. This thesis will compare effectiveness of the civilian and military maritime 
agency cooperation in those three countries, and whether the findings can make a 
difference in the prevention of escalation.  
The thesis will also address the cooperation of various international civilian and 
military maritime agencies in the region. The discussion will show how those 
organizations may—or may not—contribute to conflict prevention in the South China 
Sea, such as by providing a forum for more interaction among claimant countries.  
In order to investigate the nature of the clashes in the South China Sea, the thesis 
will provide some background about the conflict and compare chronological skirmish 
data from the signing of the DoC in 2002 until the present. I will analyze the data on 
clashes from trusted reports only. It will show the claimant countries’ tendencies to 
deploy more of their civilian maritime agencies to the disputed waters, partly as an effort 
to limit the probability of escalation.  
The research will be derived mainly from literature such as official government 
documents, laws and regulations, public documents, and any other written reputable 
sources. In addition, being familiar with the operational environment in the region, I will 
include my empirical experiences as well. 
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II. COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC CIVILIAN AND MILITARY 
MARITIME AGENCY COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As previously noted, this thesis focuses on the effectiveness of cooperation 
between the Philippines and Vietnam’s civilian and military maritime agencies. It posits 
that if those countries cooperate effectively on the domestic level, then they will likely 
cooperate better with other claimants and, consequently, there will be a lower probability 
of escalation. Inevitably, China will be included in the comparison because of its 
proximity and assertiveness that account for the most clashes with the Philippines and 
Vietnam.  
The South China Sea disputes involve a distinctive maritime context for civil-
military relations. Unlike in mainstream civil-military relations, which concern the 
relationships between the two types of organizations within one country, in the maritime 
environment disputes tend to involve agencies between different countries. Because there 
are no inhabitants in the disputed South China Sea, except the garrisoned troops, conflicts 
occur almost exclusively among the various civilian and military maritime agencies from 
different claimant countries. The attempt to enforce national law against foreign fishing 
boats or research vessels in the disputed areas also often leads to conflict with the civilian 
and military maritime agencies that back them. This chapter will compare the cooperation 
of civilian and military maritime agencies in the Philippines, Vietnam, and China through 
three components of effectiveness: plan; interagency institutions, structure, and process; 
and resources, following by a qualitative comparative analysis. 
B. THE PHILIPPINES 
The Philippines is unique among other South China Sea claimants because it has a 
formal defense treaty with a great power. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the 
United States theoretically places the balance of power in the Philippines’ favor, 
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especially against China.32 However, the treaty might not be applicable in the disputed 
area.33 For simplicity and fairness of comparison, only the Philippines’ aspects are 
discussed. The Philippines is currently building both the Philippine Navy (PN) and the 
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) capabilities, because most of their assets are obsolete, and 
some even date back to the World War II era.34 However, lack of funding and support 
makes the implementation of the plan according to the timeline difficult; even the 
Philippines’ defense secretary expressed his pessimism in 2011.35 
1. The Philippine Navy 
The PN consists of the Fleet and Marine Corps. In the South China Sea, 
specifically, the Fleet mainly deals with the maritime law enforcement role, while the 
Marines garrison the islands. Other than activities in the disputed areas, most of the time, 
the Navy is conducting internal security operations against insurgent groups in the 
Southern Philippines.36 The PN is comprised of six regional commands: the Naval Forces 
North, Central, South, West, Western Mindanao, and Eastern Mindanao.37 However, the 
Marines are concentrated in the Mindanao and Palawan islands since the priority of the 
government is focused on counter insurgencies.38 With limited external threat priorities 
other than asserting sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (or West Philippine Sea), 
the Navy is still focusing on the constabulary or law enforcement roles, such as anti-
32 Timo Kivimӓki, Liselotte Odgaard, and Stein Tønnesson, “What Could Be Done?” in War or Peace 
in the South China Sea?, ed. Timo Kivimӓki (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002), 140.   
33 Ibid. 
34 Bjørn Møller, “The Military Aspects of the Disputes,” in War or Peace in the South China Sea?, ed. 
Timo Kivimӓki (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002), 72. 
35 “Armed Forces, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, December 3, 
2014, 8, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305078. 
36 Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC), Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines: 
Challenges and Prospects, September 2013, 8, http://www.delex.com/data/files/
DMAC%20Research%20Study%201%20%28Philippines%29.pdf.   





                                                 
smuggling, and anti-illegal fishing, which are supposedly the main business of the 
PCG.39  
2. The Philippine Coast Guard 
Established in 2009, the PCG is a civilian maritime law enforcement agency 
under the Department of Transportation and Communications.40 Following the United 
States’ practice, the PCG is responsible for maritime safety, protection, and law 
enforcement, leaving maritime defense to the Navy. In wartime, it is attached to the 
Department of National Defense (DND).41 The PCG also established a close relationship 
with its Japanese counterpart and has obtained training and equipment supports in 
response to China’s increased activity in the South China Sea.42  
3. The National Coast Watch System  
In order to rectify problems in coordinating various maritime agencies, the 
Philippines government established the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) in 2011 
with Presidential Executive Order (EO) 57 as the umbrella of the Philippines maritime 
stakeholder cooperation. Starting in 2008 with assistance from Australia, the Coast 
Watch South—as the embryo of the NCWS—was originally focused on providing 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the troubled Southern Philippine area of 
Mindanao. The NCWS is composed of multiple agencies that attempt to address the 
Philippines’ maritime security under the National Coast Watch Council. The Council is 
composed of stakeholders in maritime security issues: “the Secretaries of Transportation 
and Communications, National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior Justice, Energy, 
39 DMAC, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 8. 
40 “Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009,” Department of Transportation and Communications of 
Republic of the Philippines, http://www.coastguard.gov.ph/images/philcoastguard/IRR-RA_9993.pdf.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Manabu Sasaki and Yoshihiro Makino, “Japan Coast Guard Vessels and Equipment in High 
Demand in S.E. Asia, Africa,” Asahi Shimbun, September 30, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/
around_asia/AJ201309300001.  
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Finance, Environment and Natural Resources.” In due course, the system was enhanced 
in 2011 with assistance from the United States.43  
4. Plan 
The Philippines have several plans for dealing with its maritime security issues. 
The navy has developed its doctrine through the Sail Plan 2020, as part of the armed 
forces modernization program.44 The document emphasizes the shift of naval operations 
toward external threats.45 However, the Sail Plan 2020 drawback is perhaps too much 
focus on external threats, because it does not explain how the Navy will cooperate with 
civilian maritime agencies such as the PCG or Maritime Group of the PNP.46 In terms of 
cooperation with other maritime agencies or the Navy, the Coast Guard Law of 2009 
does state that “the PCG shall continue to develop and maintain inter-operability with 
other armed and uniformed services.”47 However, how the PCG should implement the 
law mandates is not clearly explained. This situation contributes to the difficulties in 
maritime interagency cooperation in the Philippines. In order to implement the inter-
agency maritime cooperation plan, both the Navy and the PCG need to establish their 
own organizations before they can effectively conduct any joint engagements. 
5. Interagency Institutions, Structures, and Process  
Appreciating all the Philippines’ difficulties in enforcing law and maintaining 
order in its waters, the establishment of the NCWS is crucial to amalgamate various 
maritime related stakeholders. The NCWS provides the umbrella for multi-agency 
cooperation, from not only the law enforcement agencies such as the PN, the PNP, the 
43 DMAC, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 5–6, 18–20. 
44 “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, September 1, 2014, 2, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305082 ; “Armed Forces, Philippines,” Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, December 3, 2014, 7, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/
CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305078.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020, accessed December 6, 2014, 
http://www.nrcmis.org/index.php/naval-reserve-commands/headquarters-naval-reserve-command/nr5/182-
the-philippine-navy-strategic-sail-plan-2020.  
47 “The Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009,” Republic of the Philippines, April 19, 2011, Rule 2.2. 
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PNP Maritime Group, and the PCG, but from the service sectors such as the Maritime 
Industry Authority (Marina) and the Philippines Port Authority (PPA). The NCWS 
incorporates the whole archipelago but does not include the disputed area in the South 
China Sea (see Figure 2).48 
All related maritime stakeholders’ resources are pooled in the NCWS.49 The 
NCW Council then coordinates the country’s various maritime agencies.50 The Navy 
contributes most to the NCWS, such as surveillance and C2 systems, and patrol 
vessels/aircrafts, with other agencies’ limited contribution, making “the NCWS [still] 
Navy centric.”51 The Navy personnel are reporting through their chain of command 
because the NCWS belongs to the PN.52 However, coordination and communication is 
still difficult; for example, the PN detachment in the disputed area has to relay messages 
to its own headquarters in Palawan.53  
 
 
Figure 2.  Philippines Coast Watch System54 
48 DMAC, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 18–20, 33–34. 
49 Ibid., 20. 
50 Ibid., 18–19. 
51 Ibid., 20.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Tessa Jamandre, “China fired at Filipino fishermen in Jackson atoll,” ABS-CBN, last updated 
March 6, 2011, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/06/02/11/china-fired-filipino-fishermen-jackson-atoll. 
54 DMAC, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 19. 
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There are still many obstacles before the NCWS could be able to effectively 
coordinate all agencies. First, inadequate funding and assets mean that the system is 
difficult to mature beyond the drawing table; it is likely that the Navy is still the main 
player while other stakeholders’ contributions are minimal.55 Second, consequently, most 
of the attention is still on the troubled Southern Mindanao and the ports of Manila and 
Batangas, leaving lower priority areas unguarded.56 Third, the measurement of effective 
cooperation among maritime agencies is still problematic because those stakeholders tend 
to become rivals, especially in the media, perhaps in order to secure the government 
budget.57 To conclude, the indecisive and much criticized Philippine government 
response to the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in late 2013 highlights the magnitude of the 
challenge that the country has; the problem in multiple agency cooperation is not unique 
to the maritime domain.58 
6. Resources and Professional Norms 
Besides the availability of plan and structure as well as process, each civilian and 
military maritime agency should have adequate resources on their own before committing 
to multi-agency cooperation. In general, the resources fall into “equipment, trained 
forces, and … assets.”59 On the other hand, professional norms can also contribute to 
effectiveness.60 As such, maritime units also have more relative independence than their 
ground forces counterparts do; it means that all personnel should be trained properly and 
professionally in order to be able to operate effectively, especially in the disputed South 
China Sea waters when the chances of engagement with government vessels from other 
55 Ibid., 20–22.  
56 Ibid., 18, 34. 
57 Ibid., 21–22. 
58 John T. Sidel, “The Philippines in 2013: Disappointment, Disgrace, and Disaster,” Asian Survey 54, 
No. 1 (January/ February 2013), 70, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2014.54.1.64.  
59 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil–Military Relations, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 
2012), 32. 
60 Matei acknowledges that professional norms are not just requirements for control but also for 
effectiveness. See Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” The 
Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
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claimant countries are high. However small it is, any government vessel bears the flag of 
its respective nation and enjoys sovereign status as guaranteed by international maritime 
law; therefore, unwise or unprofessional decisions between units from different claimant 
countries could escalate the tension. Last, all the stakeholders should have adequate 
assets, in terms of number and sustainability.  
Due to the nature of maritime operations, where units operate in a vast area and at 
a great distance from their headquarters, Command and Control (C2) and surveillance 
systems are the most important equipment for the PN and the PCG. The Philippines 
Armed Forces under the Aquino administration have been undergoing modernization 
through the so-called Capability Upgrade Programme (CUP) since 2010; however, with 
inadequate funding, the plan seems too ambitious and all services need to adjust their 
goal.61 The Navy and civilian telecommunication contractors have been developing the 
Internet Protocol Virtual Private Network (IP VPN) communication network throughout 
all naval commands since 2011.62 The Philippines in early 2014 procured three maritime 
surveillance radars (originally nine) from Israel and they are expected to be operational in 
the next few years.63 It is possible that those three radars will supplement and link with 
NCWS, which is currently under development with assistance from the government of 
Australia and the United States.64 To overcome the coverage limit of land based 
surveillance radars, the DND plans to acquire six maritime patrol aircrafts (MPAs), 
which will be operated by the Air Force.65 On the other hand, as the main civilian 
maritime agency, the PCG still has inadequate resources to perform maritime law 
enforcement tasks on its own; overall, the PCG is still dependent on the PN.66 The PCG 
currently does not have a dedicated surveillance system and has to reliance on the Navy’s 
61 “Procurement, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, last posted 
September 1, 2014, 2–3, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305084.  
62 Ibid., 16. 
63 Ibid., 11. 
64 DMAC, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 18.  
65 “Procurement, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 9. 
66  “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 22. 
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radar chain, which constitutes the NCWS.67 There is little information about the C2 
capabilities of the PCG, but it is assumed that the Coast Guard also relies on the Navy’s 
communication network. 
The second category is the PN and the PCG trained personnel. The Navy’s Sail 
Plan 2020 does stress the importance of developing its personnel capability.68 The PN 
has a lot of opportunity to level up its personnel professionalism through interactions 
with foreign navies, such as training co-operation with Australia, Canada, and the United 
States, and various bilateral and multilateral naval exercises.69 In line with the Armed 
Forces modernization plan, the Navy is also refining its doctrine, especially “the rules of 
engagement [and] … human rights aspects.”70 Following the Navy, the Coast Guard 
takes the same path in applying the United States’ practice. The PCG already has its own 
training command for the enlisted and an academy for officer candidates.71 The PCG also 
establishes cooperation with other maritime stakeholders. For example, some cadets also 
trained in the Philippine Marine Merchant Academy in order to get the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) certificate.72 However, it is not uncommon in the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to give a prominent person military rank, a practice that 
potentially could disrupt professionalism and discipline; for example, the PCG just 
promoted Manny Pacquaio, a boxer, to the rank of commodore of the Coast Guard from 
his previous rank of lieutenant colonel of the reserve forces of AFP.73 
The last category of resources—assets—is perhaps the most overlooked by the 
government. The maritime forces are not the main priority because of the government’s 
focus on the prolonged counter-insurgency operations. The Navy suffers from a lack of 
67  Ibid., 19–20. 
68 The Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020, 10–11. 
69 “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 9–10. 
70 Ibid., 7. 
71 “Level Up; The Coast Guard Recruitment Program,” Philippine Coast Guard website, accessed 
December 15, 2014, http://www.coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/careers.  
72 Ibid.  
73 JB Adalia, “Pacqiaou become one-star General; gets honorary rank from Coast Guard,” Kicker 
Daily News, December 18, 2014, http://kickerdaily.com/pacquiao-becomes-one-star-general-gets-honorary-
commodore-rank-from-coast-guard/.  
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assets.74 It has numerous ships, but only three ships of the size greater than 1000 GT.”75 
However, many have exceeded their life time and some are of World War II vintage, 
because inadequate funding makes replacement and maintenance difficult; 
unsurprisingly, fleet readiness is very low.76 The newest PN ships, the ex-U.S. Coast 
Guard cutters, BRP Gregorio del Pilar and BRP Ramon Alcaraz, have longer endurance 
and are better equipped than the rest of the fleet; however, they are over 40 years old and 
the Navy seems to have difficulties in sustaining them, as shown during the standoff with 
China’s law enforcement vessels in April 2012.77 The PCG, just like the Navy, also 
endures insufficient ships and aircrafts.78 In an effort to overcome budget constraints, the 
PCG is trying to enhance cooperation with its Japanese counterpart; the Japan Coast 
Guard (JCG) has been offering assistance in the form of personal protective equipment 
and patrol vessels.79  
C. VIETNAM 
Vietnam maintains a close military relationship with Russia, India, and 
increasingly with European countries.80 Additionally, defense cooperation with the 
United States has been restored since 2011 and has been expanding to include maritime 
security cooperation since 2013.81 Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam does not have any 
defense treaty with other countries. Therefore, it has to build up its maritime capabilities 
74 “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 3. 
75 DMAC, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 28. 
76 Jane’s reveals that around half of the PN ships are afloat and most are in-operational, see “Navy, 
Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 2–3; DMAC, Maritime Domain 
Awareness in the Philippines, 22.  
77 “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 4, 6; DMAC, Maritime 
Domain Awareness in the Philippines, 29. 
78 Ibid., 23. 
79 Ibid., 24; Manabu Sasaki and Yoshihiro Makino, “Japan Coast Guard vessels and equipment in high 
demand in S.E. Asia, Africa,” The Asahi Shimbun, last updated September 30, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/
article/asia/around_asia/AJ201309300001. 
80 “Armed Forces, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, last posted 
November 4, 2014, 1,   https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305172; “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Assessment–Southeast Asia, last posted October 8, 2014, 5, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/
CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305175.  
81 Ibid., 3.  
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to cope with other claimant countries in the South China Sea. Vietnam employs vessels 
from the Coast Guard and Fishery Surveillance Force in the South China Sea.82 
1. The Vietnam People’s Navy 
The Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) falls under the Armed Forces of Vietnam, or 
the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA).83 With the increasing tension in Vietnam’s maritime 
claims in the South China Sea, the Navy and Air Force have received more attention than 
ever before and have started their modernization programs, as explained in the Defence 
White Paper of 2009.84 To realize this plan, the government has increased its defense 
budget, “to about USD 4 Billion in 2014” alone.85 With a bigger allocated budget than 
the Philippines to spend in the development of maritime defense and security capabilities, 
Vietnam has a better chance to provide resources in implementing the plan and fulfilling 
its maritime command structures.  
The VPN is structured into five regional commands, 1st to 5th Naval Region or 
Zone 1 to 5 (see Figure 3), where it deploys its fleet, naval infantry (similar to marine 
corps), and naval aviation.86 The naval infantry garrisons all the islands and features 
claimed by Vietnam in the South China Sea and “form[s] the core of the country’s rapid 
reaction” force in those areas.87 The VPN has two parallel chain-in-command structures, 
following the VPA practice, the military commander, and the political commissar.88 The 
purpose of this unique system is to ensure the military discipline and loyalty to the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).89  
82 Sasaki and Makino, “Japan Coast Guard vessels and equipment.”  
83 “Armed Forces, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 1.  
84 Ibid., 1–2; Vietnam National Defence, Ministry of National Defence (2009), 47. 
85 “Armed Forces, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 2. 
86 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 6; Vietnam National 
Defence, Ministry of National Defence, 73. 
87 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 3. 
88 Vietnam National Defence, Ministry of National Defence, 48–51. 
89 Ibid., 91. 
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Figure 3.  The VPN Regional Commands90 
However, the VPA still have a limited interoperability among its tri-services: the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force.91 The Navy, just like other services, is heavily involved in 
the society and economy, especially when it is related to the maritime context such as 
“offshore fishing … [and] promoting aquaculture activities in the coastal region.”92 In 
this regard, the VPN maintains hotlines with its counterparts from “China, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand” to deal with fisheries problems in their maritime boundaries.93 
This practice may hamper effective maritime inter-agency cooperation and further the 
rivalries among them, as it seems the VPN takes some of the Vietnam’s maritime civilian 
agencies duties.  
90 The VPN Regional Command, accessed January 13, 2015, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/e/ef/Vietnam_Naval_Regions.jpg. 
91 “Armed Forces, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 3. 
92 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 3–4. 
93 Ibid., 3–4. 
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2. Vietnam Civilian Maritime Agencies 
Vietnam has two civilian maritime agencies, the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) and 
Vietnam Directorate of Fisheries.94 The VCG is the transformation of the Maritime 
Police in order to be qualified to receive patrol vessels and equipment from the JCG 
donation.95 The defense white paper of Vietnam reveals that the Vietnam Coast Guard 
(also known as Maritime Police/the VMP) is actually one branch of the Vietnam People’s 
Army (VPA) and under the Ministry of National Defense administration.96 The VCG 
inherited the VMP infrastructure and assets, but claims it does not have a direct link with 
the VPA, although it is administratively under the MND.97 Thus, what seems like white 
hulls are not always pure civilian agencies, as in the VCG case. Currently, the VCG is 
undergoing an organization reform in order to fulfill the requirement of receiving aid 
from the JCG.98 The Coast Guard also has a similar structure of regional command with 
the Navy (see Figure 4).  
94 Sasaki and Makino, “Japan Coast Guard vessels and equipment.” 
95 Ibid. 
96 “Vietnam National Defence,” (Defense White Paper), Ministry of National Defence of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi, December 2009), 57, http://mod.gov.vn/wps/wcm/connect/caadf77c-2fb4-
48c1-8f20-8d3216ad2513/2009eng.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=caadf77c-2fb4-48c1-8f20-
8d3216ad2513.   
97 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 6–7. 
98 Sasaki and Makino, “Japan Coast Guard,” Ibid. 
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Figure 4.  The VCG Regional Commands99 
The policy to enhance civilian maritime agencies seems derived from the VPN’s 
ill-fated experiences when engaged with the stronger People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN), such as the one in 1988 in Spratly.100 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 
concludes that the establishment of VCG is an effort by the government of Vietnam to 
limit tension in the disputed waters.101 In Vietnam’s view, the employment of vessels 
that belong to the civilian maritime agencies would likely be more flexible and appear 
more benign without unnecessarily escalating the conflict.  
99 The VCG Regional Commands, accessed January 13, 2015, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/0/06/Vietnam_Marine_Police_regions.jpg. 
100 Ibid., 4. 
101 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 7. 
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3. Plan 
The longstanding disputes between Vietnam and China in the Gulf of Tonkin and 
the South China Sea over natural resources prompted the government of Vietnam to 
consolidate all maritime stakeholders in the Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020, 
focusing on the development of maritime capability.102 This policy then was translated as 
the modernization plan of the naval forces, including associated infrastructures.103 The 
Defence White Paper of 2009 (along with two similar documents since 1998) is currently 
the formal reference of all services modernization.104 In parallel with the government of 
Vietnam’s focus on the development of its maritime capabilities, the Navy has priority 
over other services of the VPA with allocated 2014 budget of USD 706 million.105 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Navy and Maritime Police (which was 
transformed into the Vietnam Coast Guard/VCG in October 2013) are under the Ministry 
of National Defence of Vietnam (MND); this means that both agencies have the same 
doctrine.106 However, just as in the case of Philippines, the Vietnam’s Defense White 
Paper does not explain the form of cooperation between those agencies. 
4. Interagency Institutions, Structure, and Process 
There is no known maritime cooperation at the national level between those under 
Vietnam civilian agencies and the MND. However, the fact that the Vietnam’s Navy and 
the Coast Guard are under the Ministry of National Defence, unlike the common practice 
to separate the military and civilian maritime agencies under different ministries, may 
give an indicator that the VCG is a subordinate to the VPN via the MND. The 
predecessor of the VCG, the Vietnam Maritime Police (VMP), was responsible for 
maritime law enforcement within the VPN’s regional command.107 Regarding the 
Directorate of Fisheries, although they are not under the MND, but given the influence of 
102 Ibid., 5.  
103 Ibid., 2. 
104 “Armed Forces, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 2. 
105 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, Ibid.  
106 Vietnam National Defence, Ministry of National Defence, 109. 
107 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 6–7. 
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the VPA, it is likely that at least their vessels operate under the influence of the Navy. 
Both the VCG and the Directorate of Fisheries vessels are deployed in the disputed areas 
in the South China Sea, enforcing Vietnam’s maritime claim and sometimes escorting the 
country’s fishing fleets from other claimants’ maritime law enforcement assets.108 The 
VPN seems to provide back-up from a distance, following China’s practice. However, 
when Western journalists sailed recently with the VCG patrol vessel, they found out that 
there were no means of communication between Vietnam’s maritime agencies’ units 
operating in the disputed area.109 It means that maritime operational units operate 
individually, although there are another agency ships in the same area. Consequently, it 
relies mostly on the skipper’s judgment to avoid escalation in any situation. 
5. Resources and Professional Norms 
The respective discussions in resources and professional norms are focused on 
Vietnam’s maritime C2 and surveillance equipment, the professionalism of personnel, 
and the adequate number and readiness of assets belonging to both the VPN and the 
VCG. The Directorate of Fisheries is not included in the following comparison because it 
has insignificant resources compared to the VPN and the VCG. 
The first category is the equipment of the VPN and the VCG, in the form of 
maritime C2 and surveillance systems. In line with the Defence White Paper of 2009 and 
the shift of the government of Vietnam’s policy toward securing its maritime claims, the 
VPN has been undergoing a relatively moderate modernization. Currently, the VPN is 
developing a “mobile coastal defense system” with Russian assistance.110 The intention 
is probably to use the missile system as a force multiplier against China, which has been 
becoming more powerful than Vietnam (and everyone else in the region). The Navy also 
expands its aviation in the maritime patrol, utility, and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
108 Euan McKirdy, “Boats and brinksmanship up close in the South China Sea,” CNN, June 5, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/05/world/asia/vietnam-paracel-reporters-diary/.  
109 Ibid.  
110 “Procurement, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, last posted October 
8, 2014, 9, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305177.  
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roles.111 Both the coastal missile system (especially its surveillance radar and 
communication network) and naval aviation can theoretically be utilized in enhancing 
Vietnam’s MDA and benefitting civilian maritime agencies as well. With the Navy 
gradually turning its focus toward maritime defense, the importance of the Coast Guard is 
becoming more prominent. However, although the VCG inherited all the Maritime Police 
infrastructure and assets, it still has limited resources. The Coast Guard is lacking the 
modern C2 and surveillance systems in order to effectively monitor its area of 
responsibilities. The VCG is likely still depending on the VPN’s C2 network, since there 
is no plan revealed to the public to acquire such a system exclusively for maritime law 
enforcement purposes. However, if it follows the pattern of the VPA, where there is little 
interoperability between services, the cooperation in the terms of C2 and surveillance 
systems—especially in information exchange—remains difficult. Consequently, since 
2009, the Coast Guard has been developing its maritime surveillance system, comprised 
of light transport aircrafts in MPA configuration connected to the ground control and 
mission command system.112 
The second category is the VPN and the VCG trained personnel. Following the 
VPA general practice, the VPN consists of regular and reserves personnel.113 The 
reserves are on three to four years’ conscription; however, the reservists are unlikely to 
serve in the submarines, which require prolonged and specialized training.114 The VPN is 
looking for assistance from Russia and India to overcome its inadequate training, 
especially to train submariners and aviators.115 Although still limited, the Navy tries to 
raise the level of professionalism by exposing its members to foreign navies through 
participation in joint exercises: bilaterally such as with the U.S. Navy on non-combatant 
topics in 2011, and multilaterally such as with Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
111 Ibid., 8. 
112 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 6–7. 
113 Ibid., 3. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 6 
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(WPNS) activities.116 On the other hand, the VCG is still facing inadequate trained 
personnel.117 Currently, most Coast Guard personnel are derived from the VPA.118 The 
VCG can still obtain its personnel from the VPA’s education establishments until the 
Coast Guard has its own. The problem with this practice is that certain personnel, because 
of their training, will have a higher probability of acting as military in the disputed areas 
than as maritime law enforcement; consequently, it may escalate tension with maritime 
agencies from other claimant countries in the South China Sea. To overcome the 
manpower issues, the VCG is sending some of its personnel overseas to have proper 
education and training from foreign Coast Guards, such as Japan, Singapore, and the 
United States.119 Bilaterally, the VCG is establishing cooperation with its Philippines’ 
counterpart, while multilaterally, the Coast Guard is attending the annual Head of Asian 
Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM).120 
The last category is the resources that belonging to the VPN and the VCG. With 
the availability of funds to modernize the VPN and the VCG, there is a better chance of 
cooperation over the resources belonging to both agencies, as well as the Department of 
Fisheries. However, because the Navy and the Coast Guard are still pursuing their own 
priorities, joint utilization of resources is yet difficult. The Navy still has issues in 
maintaining the adequate number and readiness of its assets, limiting the VPN’s overall 
operational capability.121 Although the VPN is expanding its procurement to Europe and 
Canada, Russia and India remain important in terms of supplying spare parts for its ex-
Soviet hardware.122 To reduce dependencies and obtain military technology, the Navy 
has been building ships from local shipyards with the assistance and license from Russia 
116 Ibid., 10–11. 
117 Van Hieu, transl., “Vietnam Marine Police Force’s international cooperation strengthened,” 
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since 2012.123 On the other hand, the VCG has been trying to modernize its inventories 
in order to keep up with the increasing threats to the Vietnam maritime claim in the South 
China Sea.124 To implement and upgrade its capabilities, the Coast Guard procured new 
patrol vessels plus helicopters from Netherland; the same factory also agreed to help 
build such ships locally under license.125 In 2014, the Vietnam government has allocated 
a budget of USD 747 million to the VCG and Vietnam Directorate of Fisheries to 
enhance their capabilities, bigger than the Navy.126 In other developments, as part of the 
increasing cooperation between Vietnam and Japan, the JCG is donating its patrol vessels 
to the VCG, as well as associated training and funding.127  
D. CHINA 
China has enormous military advantages over the other countries in the region, 
especially to those that have claims over the South China Sea. However, being the 
strongest country in the region, China’s has been careful to minimize the use of the 
PLAN in dealing with other South China Sea claimant countries’ maritime assets.128 
Some scholars argue that China will favor negotiation and avoid war over maritime 
disputes.129 The reason is to maintain China’s unconfrontational image and to prevent 
other claimants from joining forces against it. The reorganization of the “four of five 
[China’s] maritime law enforcement (MLE) into … the China Coast Guard” seems in line 
with the policy of maintaining low military presence in the maritime disputed area in 
order to prevent escalation.130 
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making,” Journal of Contemporary China (London: Taylor and Francis, September 26, 2013), 241–242. 
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1. The People’s Liberation Army Navy 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has distinct civil-military relations on the 
foreign affairs when it comes in the matters related to the national security and military. 
The PLA has representatives in the Central Military Commission (CMC) who work in 
parallel with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), both under the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC).131 The PLA actively involves in China’s security and military-related 
foreign affairs policy decision making through the CMC while the MoFA deals with 
general foreign affairs policy.132 The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure the 
stability of the regime with balancing China’s national interest and domestic politics, 
especially preventing public outcry over the management of the maritime territorial 
disputes.133 With those calculated actions, the PLA manages to show firmness for the 
domestic public while in the same time prevents escalation with the United States and 
other claimant countries in the East China Sea or the South China Sea.134  
Since 1986, the PLA has been undergoing modernization programs focusing on 
high technology military capabilities.135 The aim is to shift from the “manpower-
intensive to … technology intensive” armed forces.136 This transformation means a 
change from the army dominated PLA command structures to more balanced 
composition consisting of PLAN and PLAAF (PLA Air Force) personnel.137 Under the 
new arrangement of the CMC to enhance the tri services interoperability, the coastal 
Maritime Regions (MRs) now incorporates personnel from the PLAN and PLAAF.138 
While the Navy is now focusing more on China’s national defense, the civilian maritime 
131 You Ji, “The PLA and Diplomacy: unraveling myths about the military role in foreign policy 
making,” Journal of Contemporary China (London: Taylor and Francis, September 26, 2013), 237, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.832526.  
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135 “Armed Forces, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–China and Northeast Asia, last 
posted April 22, 2014, 3. 
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137 Ibid. 
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agencies are also undertaking a robust transformation in order to police the country’s 
maritime claims.139 
2. Maritime Law Enforcement 
Before the reorganization of Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) in 2013, there 
were five civilian agencies in charge of the China’s maritime law enforcement: Marine 
Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Coast Guard, Maritime Safety 
Administration, and Customs Anti-Smuggling Bureau.140 Currently, all of those five 
agencies, except for the Maritime Safety Administration, form the new China Coast 
Guard (CCG).141 This is an important step to centralize the intertwined confusing 
jurisdiction among those agencies, which were once under the China’s central 
government and coastal provinces.142 Theoretically, with a unified system, the CCG will 
be able to close the capabilities gap between MLEs in the central government with those 
in the coastal provinces; thus, China would be able to decrease the unintentional 
escalation incited by the less capable provincial MLEs.  
3. Plan 
The reorganization of the MLE agencies into the CCG makes the division of tasks 
in China’s maritime interest clearer. The civilian maritime agencies will take charge in 
enforcing China’s waters including in disputed areas, while the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) will focus on defending the country and safeguarding its commercial 
shipping sea lanes.143 You Ji argues that China intentionally “does not have a long-term 
maritime policy” in order to provide more room for domestic politics and foreign 
139 Moss, “China’s other navies,” 28. 
140 Moss, “China’s other navies,” 29; Martinson, “Power to the Provinces,” 4. 
141 “External Affairs, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–China and Northeast Asia, last 
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People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The U.S. Army War College Press, 
April 2014), 257–258, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1201.  
 32 
                                                 
negotiation, and maintain the status quo in the disputed waters.144 At least, PLAN tries to 
portray its unthreatening figure in the Defence White Paper of 2013 by outlining the 
importance of cooperation in “peacekeeping and security missions,” despite the current 
naval development.145 
The PLAN doctrine is to defend China against attack from the sea along the 
imaginary lines called the first and second island chains which connect the Taiwan-
Ryukyu-Hainan-the South China Sea-Vietnam in the former and extend to Japan-Guam-
South Pacific in the latter (see Figure 5).146 The concept has been evolving from the 
coastal defense into the distant sea defense since late 1980s, following the modernization 
of the PLAN.147 Despite the increasing capability of the PLA in the recent years, You Ji 
concludes that it will prefer the political or diplomatic gain rather than military victory 
because of its vulnerability in the land borders and the risk of domestic political 
instability if war goes wrong for the Chinese.148 Therefore, the PLAN prefers to use the 
civilian maritime agencies in the disputed waters to prevent escalation with navies from 
other claimant countries or the United States.149 
144 You Ji, Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty 
Disputes in the China Seas (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October 2013), 1, 
http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/policy_brief/Policy-Brief-Deciphering-Beijing-Maritime-
Security.pdf.  
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Figure 5.  China’s First and Second Islands Defense150 
The civilian maritime agencies are in the forefront of China’s “one-plus strategy” 
in the disputed waters, a strategy based on non-military proportional reprisal against other 
claimants maritime assets.151 The China’s one-plus strategy is strong enough to show 
firmness for the foreign and domestic audiences, without provoking a military response 
by the United States.152 In any case, if a clash occurs, the MLEs will answer to the PLAN 
as the main agency in managing China’s maritime disputed waters.153 In spite of this, the 
implementation of the policy is still a challenge; in 2011, the Chinese defense minister 
was unaware of the action taken by a Chinese civilian ship cutting the cable of a 
Vietnam’s oil research vessel.154 
4. Interagency Institutions, Structure, and Process 
Regarding the management of the South China Sea, PLA’s overall operational 
command is located in the Navy Xisha Surveillance District at the Sansha, comprising of 
150 “The People’s Liberation Army Navy,” 5. 
151 Ji, Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security, 1. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ji, “The PLA and Diplomacy,” 250. 
154 Ibid., 251. 
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joint services personnel.155 As a consensus, the PLA deals with the military affairs 
whereas the State Ocean Administration (SOA) manages the maritime law 
enforcement.156 In anticipation of the likely encounter with other countries maritime 
assets in the disputed South China Sea, the Navy and the SOA jointly develop “pre-
formulated scenario plans”; however, the PLAN has overall command in any situation.157 
During the stand-off with the PN flag ship BRP Gregorio Del Pilar in the Scarborough 
Shoal in 2012, a number of unarmed or lightly armed MLE vessels managed to prevent 
the capture of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines without involving PLAN assets.158 
Observing the number of China’s MLEs involved in the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff, it raised questions about the overlapping tasks of those agencies and the 
possibility of rivalries among them.159 On the other hand, it also possible that the 
cooperation did exist and those agencies received direction from China’s central 
government.160 Nevertheless, the reorganization of the China’s MLEs brings both the 
opportunity of the decreasing of uncoordinated action that could lead into escalation of 
conflict in the South China Sea disputed waters and the challenges of uniting different 
procedures and expertise from four maritime law enforcement agencies together into the 
new CCG.161 
5. Resources and Professional Norms 
The PLA personnel outnumbering China’s neighbors’ armed forces, even after the 
mass reduction of military personnel since its modernization program in the late 
1980s.162 With the decreasing number of personnel, the PLA has been able to develop its 
members’ capabilities to cope with the transformation of the military doctrine into 
155 Ibid., 250–251. 
156 Ibid., 251. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Moss, “China’s other navies,” 28, 31–32. 
159 Ibid., 28. 
160 Ibid., 31. 
161 Ibid., 32. 
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information technology (IT) based armed forces.163 Currently, China has been able to 
acquire sophisticated IT on its own, such as communication and navigation satellites, 
which are crucial to modern military operations and enhance services interoperability. 
Although still modest by Western standards, the PLA’s exercises gradually incorporated 
the electronic warfare environment in the scenario.164 On the other hand, in order to 
oversee China’s maritime waters and claims, its civilian maritime agencies have been 
growing rapidly in the recent years.165 With the recent reorganization of China’s MLEs, 
it is still unclear how the agency applies its C2 system in optimizing operations. 
However, there are divisions of labor in exercising the Maritime Rights Protection (MRP) 
between the coastal provinces in order to support the central government efforts in 
asserting China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. 166 The coastal provinces now 
are acquiring more capable patrol vessel that can cover longer distance, while still 
retaining the smaller ones for coastal patrols.167 It means that the Hainan Province can 
deploy its MLE vessels to conduct MRP operation in the disputed South China Sea, 
which most of it under its administration.168  
Regarding the professionalism, the reduction of personnel means that the PLA 
would be able to provide better education and training for its members. While the PLA 
still relies on the reservist, it also tries to attract more educated people to join the military. 
The PLA, especially the PLAN, interaction with foreign military also has been increasing 
significantly in recent years. The PLAN has been participating in various exercises and 
multinational operation such as the United States sponsored RIMPAC 2014 and the anti-
piracy efforts in the Somali waters. In contrast, the MLEs are still having problems to 
standardize personnel education and training, since the four civilian maritime agencies 
before the integration all have different procedures and equipment across the central and 
provincial level. As the MLE units from provincial level join the patrol in disputed 
163 Ibid., 3. 
164 Ibid., 5.  
165 Moss, “China’s other navies,” 28. 
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waters, it means that those vessels are conducting China’s foreign policy. Ryan D. 
Martinson points out that the situation could potentially end in inappropriate management 
when engaging other claimants’ assets and lead to unintentional escalation, since there is 
a disparity of the professionalism of the MLE personnel between the central government 
and provincial level. The incident of the harassment of USS Impeccable by a provincial 
MLE vessel in the mid-2013 highlights the concern.169 
The PLAN current modernization, especially with the newly acquired aircraft 
carrier, will boost its power projection capability to protect China’s interest overseas. The 
naval detachment continuous deployment in the Somali waters also shows that the PLAN 
is able to sustain long range operation for extended time. Moreover, the PLAN is starting 
to deploy its vessels regularly beyond the first island chains. With all of those 
developments and the increasingly wariness of China’s neighbors, the roles of civilian 
maritime agencies would become more important in the management of the South China 
Sea disputed waters.170 Overall, the China’s civilian maritime agencies do not need for 
immediate PLAN intervention in managing the disputed waters in the South China Sea 
because they have greater number and bigger vessels compare to those belong to other 
claimant countries, although those ships are lightly armed or unarmed.  
E. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
It is problematic to measure and compare the effectiveness of the military and 
civilian maritime agency cooperation in the Philippines, Vietnam, and China with only 
narrative explanations. Therefore, the author will employ a simple qualitative 
comparative analysis method in visualizing the differences and identify both the 
weaknesses and the strengths of the cooperation among those agencies in each country. 
However, the author warns that the method is not free from subjectivity because it is 
based upon personal judgment and perceptions. Both the Philippines and Vietnam are 
comparing to China; in spite of this, China does not necessarily have the maximum score, 
just because it is the most formidable one.  
169 Ibid., 3, 5–7.  
170 Ibid., 5–6, 8. 
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There are two groups determined by the author: agencies (navy, civilian maritime 
agencies, and joint maritime efforts) and measurement of effectiveness (plan; interagency 
institutions, structure, and process; and resources). To simplify the reading, all numbers 
have been converted to qualitative words. For all categories, there are seven scales 
ranging from absent (the lowest/not available or not existing), absent-low, low, low-
medium, medium, medium-high, and high (the highest). The following tables (Table 1 to 
3) are the summaries of this chapter comparison if the military and civilian maritime 
agency cooperation effectiveness in the Philippines, Vietnam, and China, respectively. 











Plan Low Low Low Low 
Interagency 
Institutions, 
Structure, & Process 
Medium Low Low Low-
medium 
Resources Low Low Low Low 
 
Table 1 shows that most of the values are low. The Navy’s interagency institution, 
structure and process value is medium because it has adequate number Regional 
Commands facing the likely threats. The country is facing a difficult situation in 
coordinating its military and civilian maritime agencies effectively because it has 
inadequate resources, although the Philippines has a number of regulations and plans to 
conduct joint maritime efforts. There are very limited assets that can be committed to 
conduct joint efforts in maritime security. At least for the near future, it is likely that 
other agencies will still have to rely on the overstretched and ageing Navy if there is no 
significant increase of budget. Insufficient resources also limit the PN and the PCG to 
develop their doctrines because they have to be realistic and not to set a very fancy plan. 
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As a result, it is possible that in dealing with the South China Sea problems, the 
Philippines will continue its current diplomatic approach to internationalize the disputes 
and nationalist rhetoric to look firm in the front of domestic audience.  











Plan Low Low Low Low 
Interagency 
Institutions, 
Structure, & Process 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Resources Low-medium Low-medium Low-medium Medium 
 
Table 2 shows that Vietnam does not have clear doctrines to guide the 
cooperation among the VPN and civilian maritime agencies. There is also low 
effectiveness in joint maritime efforts, although the VPN and the VCG seem have a 
relatively balanced power. The possible reason is because the military as the vanguard of 
the CPV still dominates many non-military related aspects in Vietnam, overshadowing 
civilian agencies that have responsibilities for this area. This problem of inter-agency 
rivalry seems to be the biggest challenge to effective domestic maritime cooperation, 
even as both the VPN and the VCG are undergoing relatively extensive modernization. 
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Plan Medium Low Low Medium 
Interagency 
Institutions, 
Structure, & Process 
High Medium Medium Medium-high 
Resources High Medium-high Low-medium Medium-high 
 
Table 3 shows that China has many advantages over the Philippines and Vietnam, 
especially the strength of the PLAN and the resources of the MLEs. With the massive 
development of China’s MLEs, it is likely that the PLAN will focus on defense matters 
more than maritime law enforcement. However, China still has to overcome with the 
problems coming from the integration of its MLEs, which consist of various agencies and 
different coastal provinces. The main concern is in the effectiveness of cooperation 
among China’s MLEs themselves, rather than between the PLAN and the MLEs. China 
will likely to continue its current practice by employing its MLEs in dealing with 
maritime disputes, while the PLAN takes charge of the overall situation in the 
background. 
F. CONCLUSION  
To conclude, Table 4 illustrates the comparison of domestic military and civilian 
maritime agencies. Although China is not the focus of this thesis, it is included in the 
assessment along with the Philippines and Vietnam because of its central roles in the 
South China Sea disputes. 
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Table 4.   The Comparison of Maritime Cooperation Effectiveness 
 The Philippines Vietnam China 
Plan Low Low-low Low-medium 
Interagency Institutions, 







Resources Low-low Medium-low Medium-high 
 
Table 4 shows that an inadequate plan is the most common problem in all three 
countries compared. In general, the white papers, doctrines, regulations, and other 
documents related to maritime security from those three countries do not elaborate 
enough on how the cooperation of military and civilian maritime agencies should be 
performed.  
Table 4 also reveals that cooperation is the least effective in the Philippines, while 
in Vietnam modest cooperation exists. China has the most effective military and civilian 
maritime agency cooperation compared to the Philippines and Vietnam.  
Regarding the resources category, Table 4 shows that the Philippines has very 
little maritime resources available. The situation may hamper further prospect of an 
effective domestic maritime cooperation in the Philippines. On the other hand, Vietnam 
has reasonable resources and it may further narrow the gap between its civilian maritime 
agencies capabilities with China in the near future, if Vietnam continues its maritime 
capabilities development. Lastly, China’s maritime capabilities, both military and 
civilian, are dwarfing those of the Philippines and Vietnam. China may not need to 
deploy its military to assert maritime claims in the South China Sea.  
As for implications, there are two possibilities: some form of an arms race among 
claimant countries in the South China Sea in order to assert their claims—which is 
expensive and raises the risk of escalation because it may also trigger more rivalries 
among domestic agencies—or a more sensible choice of cooperation among disputant 
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countries that includes all military and civilian maritime agencies. The latter may 
eventually improve each country’s domestic maritime cooperation effectiveness.   
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III. INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MARITIME 
AGENCY COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The centrality of the geographical position of the South China Sea in the 
intertwined Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) means that any escalation would have 
a negative impact on international shipping in the area and potentially destabilize 
maritime security in the region. As a result, growing tension in recent years in the South 
China Sea over the ownership of land features and waters surrounding the area also 
become the concern of non-claimant countries in the region. Although the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was successful in bringing the claimant countries to 
sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002, 
there are still clashes in the disputed areas among those countries maritime agencies and 
therefore the risk of escalation is persist.  
Aside from the high-level political negotiations in resolving the disputes, there is 
some forums for multinational cooperation on the maritime security issues in the region 
that may contribute indirectly to the prevention of conflict in the South China Sea. Those 
include the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the North Pacific Coast Guard 
Forum (NPCGF), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and security cooperation under the ASEAN. 
However, existing multinational maritime cooperation forums have had limited impact on 
the de-escalation of the South China Sea disputes because of their limitations, such as 
memberships (military or civilian cooperation only) and purposes (counter terrorism, 
safety of life at sea, anti-piracy and sea robbery, or humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief). This chapter will elaborate on the aforementioned maritime cooperation in the 
region that currently exists and have achieved some success.  
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B. THE WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM  
The WPNS was established in 1987 as a response to the growing need for 
maritime security cooperation in the Western Pacific region.171 WPNS activities were 
initially limited to bi-annually meetings of high ranking naval officers; however, since 
2001 it has been expanding into Mine Countermeasures and Diving Exercises series. 
Since its inception, current WPNS membership has been expanding into 21 navies from 
Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, United States and Vietnam plus observers from India, 
Bangladesh, Peru, Mexico, and Pakistan.172 Therefore, from its membership, we can 
conclude that the WPNS cooperation is not limited to the Western Pacific region 
anymore, but that it encompasses the entire Pacific Ocean and some part of the Indian 
Ocean. The chairman and secretariat are rotating among member navies every one year. 
However, its membership remains limited to navies, and does not include civilian 
agencies responsible for maritime security. 
The most important milestones of the WPNS are perhaps its Business Charter and 
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). The WPNS Business Charter regulates 
the interaction among members, including meetings and exercises, on voluntarily 
basis.173 Realizing that most, if not all, of the WPNS countries are prone to natural 
disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic activities, tsunami, and typhoons, there have been 
on-going discussions to expand the Charter to incorporate Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operation procedures. In an effort to evaluate the procedure, an 
HA/DR scenario was included in the latest Mine Countermeasures and Diving Exercises 
171 “14 countries participate in Western Pacific Naval Symposium,” Antara News, June 13, 2012, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/82814/14-countries-participate-in-western-pacific-naval-symposium.  
172 Ibid.; “Pakistan given observer status in regional naval symposium,” Xinhua, April 22, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/22/c_133281621.htm.  
173 “Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) Business Charter,” Chilean Navy, last updated 
September 2012, http://wpns.sanidadnaval.cl/?page_id=99.  
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conducted in in New Zealand in 2014.174 It is important to note that every WPNS 
exercise not only focuses on the professionalism side, but also emphasizes social and 
cultural interaction among members of participant navies.175  
The CUES, on the other hand, is important because it provides a set of guideline 
for members of WPNS when their vessels or aircrafts meet maritime assets belonging to 
other members. Modelled after the United States and Soviet Union’s agreement at the 
height of the Cold War—INCSEA/the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High 
Seas—in order to avoid misinterpretation that may lead into escalation, the CUES has 
been accepted by all members of WPNS in 2014.176 The original INCSEA between the 
U.S. and the Soviet navies was successful in reducing incidents at sea, so that the same 
agreement still applied today with the Russian Navy.177 Although not legally binding and 
only applying on the high seas, the CUES makes available to the field commanders 
necessary procedures in communicating with their counterparts from other countries in 
the event of unexpected encounters at sea.178 Another important matter is the acceptance 
of the document by China, indicating its willingness to cooperate in the multilateral 
environment.179 However, as the CUES is a product of WPNS, it is strictly applicable to 
naval vessels and aircrafts; it does not include civilian maritime agencies.180 Currently, 
there is an increasing trend in the region to employ civilian maritime agencies in the 
maritime frontier, including disputed waters in the South China Sea. Therefore, there are 
174 Katherine Mulheron, “Exercise closes in the Land of the Long White Cloud,” Navy Daily, March 
16, 2014, http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Mar2014/Fleet/916/Exercise-closes-in-the-Land-of-the-Long-White-
Cloud.htm.  
175 Ibid.  
176 “Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas,” U.S. 
Department of State, accessed February 7, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm; Shannon Tiezzi, 
“Small But Positive Signs at Western Pacific Naval Symposium,” The Diplomat, April 24, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/small-but-positive-signs-at-western-pacific-naval-symposium/.  
177 Pete Pedrozo, “The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster,” Journal of 
National Security Law & Policy 6 (2012): 207. 
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Jane’s Defence Weekly 51, Issue 21 (May 21, 2014): 24.  
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increasing probabilities of clashes among those government agencies, which are not 
reported to the Navy. James Goldrick suggests that for the time being, we can only hope 
that each navy can introduce the CUES to its country’s civilian maritime agencies and 
lead to more conducive situations in the disputed waters.181  
C. THE NORTH PACIFIC COAST GUARD FORUM 
The NPCGF was established in 2000 to enhance maritime safety and security 
cooperation in the North Pacific region through information sharing and meetings.182 The 
current NPCGF members are the coast guards of Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, 
Russia, and the United States.183 The organization’s activities are annual high-ranking 
official meetings and exercises, focusing on “maritime security, maritime domain 
awareness, illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, fisheries enforcement, and 
combined operations.”184 Although there are only a few members of the NPCGF, it 
provides an opportunity for maritime law enforcement agencies’ cooperation. 
Nevertheless, unlike the WPNS, the NPCGF still has limited influence in the Pacific 
Ocean region as a whole, since its membership does not extend beyond the North Pacific 
region. One of the notable NPCGF events was the combined operation against illegal 
fishing activities involving the Canadian Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and 
China Coast Guard on the high seas in 2014.185 The USCG cutter boarded and seized Yin 
Yuan—a Chinese flagged fishing vessel—conducting illegal fishing, based on a report 
from a Canadian Coast Guard patrol aircraft; then the fishing vessel was handed over to 
the China Coast Guard ship for further investigation.186 
181 Ibid., 25.   
182 “North Pacific Coast Guard Forum,” Canadian Coast Guard, last modified June 24, 2013, 
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D. REGIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON COMBATING PIRACY 
AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS IN ASIA  
ReCAAP was established in response to the increasing maritime security threat to 
the Asian region, especially against shipping in the form of theft, robbery, hijack, and 
acts of piracy. The ReCAAP is a government-to-government organization. Its agreement 
coming into force in 2006 with 20 member countries in the region: Australia, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, 
Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam. ReCAAP focuses on information 
sharing, capacity building, and cooperation with similar purposes organizations. 
Participating countries voluntarily exchange maritime security information, especially 
incidents related to shipping, through their focal points via ReCAAP network.187 
One focus of ReCAAP is the Strait of Malacca, because the strait is an important 
route sailed by thousands of ships every year. There have been occasional attacks to 
shipping in the area. The incidents vary from robbery against ships underway in the Strait 
of Malacca to petty theft against ships in many of the ports along the waterway.188 
ReCAAP also promulgates warnings or notices to ship masters transiting incident-prone 
areas. The relatively close proximity of countries in the areas also results in some of the 
crimes being cross border in nature, in which case, they may fall under the International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) jurisdiction.189 Although ReCAAP asks for 
greater cooperation from littoral countries, there are some reasons that make two 
countries bordering the Strait of Malacca—Indonesia and Malaysia—still refuse to join 
the organization. First, the word piracy brings uncomfortable feelings to those two 
countries, since according to the UNCLOS, it only occurs in the high seas and outside of 
the jurisdiction of any states; whereas, in the Strait of Malacca, there is no high sea 
because of the short distance between Indonesia and Malaysia shores. Second, the word 
187 ReCAAP, ReCAAP ISC, accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.recaap.org/
AboutReCAAPISC.aspx.  
188 “Press Release: Nautical Forum 6/15,” The ReCAAP ISC, January 14, 2015, 
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piracy tends to internationalize the Strait of Malacca, which is under the maritime 
jurisdiction of Indonesia and Malaysia. Both countries argue that there is enough 
maritime cooperation in the Strait of Malacca, such as Coordinated Patrol conducted 
trilaterally among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (Corpat Malsindo), and bilaterally 
among those countries.190 
E. SECURITY COOPERATION UNDER THE ASEAN 
Although the ASEAN was established in 1967, the organization only created an 
institution for, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in 1993.191 More recently, the 
ASEAN significantly expanded its role in security cooperation by establishing the 
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and ADMM Plus in 2010.192 By 
the implementation of ASEAN Community in 2015, there will be further integration of 
the ASEAN within the organization itself and with extra regional countries and/ or 
organizations. All existing security cooperation, including the ARF and ADMM-Plus are 
then placed under the ASEAN Political-Security Community, one of the three pillars of 
the ASEAN Community 2015.193 There is another security-related forum under the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (AMMTC).194 However, the AMMTC only focuses on the 
transnational crime and does not discuss the maritime security issues, since the forum is 
an expansion of the ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM).195 To date, the 
ASEAN has no security cooperation with other extra regional countries and/ or 
190 Priyambodo RH, “Amankan Selat Malaka, Indonesia Belum Sepakati ReCAAP,” 
Antaranews.com, http://www.antaranews.com/berita/41300/amankan-selat-malaka-indonesia-belum-
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191 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting–Plus Counter-Terrorism Exercise (Report, Naval 
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February 9, 2015, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html.  
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http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community.  
195 Ibid.  
 48 
                                                 
organizations beyond the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. Although there are 31 countries 
have signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the Southeast Asia (TAC), 
it main purpose is to allow the respective extra regional country to join the ASEAN 
Summit and its related forums and not necessarily involve directly in the ARF and the 
ADMM-Plus.196 
1. ASEAN Regional Forum  
The ARF was established to address the region’s political and security issues 
through “confidence building and preventive diplomacy.” The ARF membership is not 
limited to ASEAN countries only, but also incorporates ASEAN dialogue partners. 
Current members of ARF are Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, 
North Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Russia, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the United States, and Vietnam. The ARF 
is a foreign ministerial level meeting and the Chairman of ASEAN Standing Committee 
is the Chairman of the ARF, which rotates every year among ASEAN members. The 
organization promotes a multilateral approach to security issues in the region and 
incorporated representatives from respective countries’ ministry of defense or security 
agencies.197  
The ARF activities are participated by wide ranging security-related agencies 
from ARF members. Currently, the ARF there are various issues that have been 
discussed, such as HA/ DR responses, preventive diplomacy, defence education 
institution cooperation, space security, Confidence Building Measures (CBM), Sea Lines 
of Communications (SLOCs) security, prevention of transnational drug trafficking, anti-
piracy and armed robbery, regional migration, counter radicalization, wildlife trafficking, 
196 The European Union (EU) is regarded as one entity and the latest signatory of the TAC is Brazil. 
See “First Latin America Country Accedes to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the Southeast Asia 
(TAC),” ASEAN Secretariat, last updated November 18, 2012, http://www.asean.org/news/asean-
secretariat-news/item/first-latin-america-country-accedes-to-the-treaty-of-amity-cooperation-in-southeast-
asia-tac.  
197 “About The ASEAN Regional Forum.” 
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Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (NPD), and cyber security.198 Those meetings and 
workshops have been expanding toward exercises related to the regional security 
cooperation. As the first step, HA/ DR exercises are being chosen because considering 
that the ARF member countries are located in natural disaster prone areas. The common 
HA/ DR exercise themes are the mitigation of the aftermath of natural disaster such as 
earthquakes, tsunami, flooding, typhoons, and volcano eruptions. The first ARF HA/DR 
exercise was conducted in the Philippines in 2009, followed by more than 20 countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region.199 Such activities may indirectly contribute to the conflict 
resolution, because HA/DR exercises encourage interaction and confidence building 
among members of the ARF, including the South China Sea claimant countries who also 
participate in the events. 
2. ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting and ADMM-Plus 
The ADMM was established in 2006 as a forum for the ASEAN member defense 
ministers to meet in the spirit of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). 
While the ARF discusses general security-related issues, the ADMM focuses on defense 
and security cooperation among armed forces in the region. Initially, the ADMM 
activities were limited to a series of meetings and workshops among ASEAN defense 
ministers, resulting in joint papers about further possibilities of collaboration in the HA/ 
DR, the incorporation of “civil society organization, and non-traditional security issues” 
among member countries.  
Considering that the region’s defense and security issues are not limited to the 
ASEAN countries only, the ADMM was extended in 2010 to include eight of the 
ASEAN dialogues partners as well.200 The eight include Australia, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.201 The purpose of ADMM-
198 “Schedule of ARF Meetings and Activities,” ASEAN Regional Forum, accessed February 28, 
2015, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/events.html?id=467.  
199 “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to Hold First Disaster Relief Exercise in the Philippines,” U.S. 
Department of State, last updated April 6, 2009, http://m.state.gov/md121338.htm.  
200 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting–Plus, 3–4.  
201 Ibid., 4. 
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Plus is to enhance regional security through confidence and capacity building among 
members, especially in the areas of maritime security, counter terrorism, disaster 
management, peacekeeping operations, and military medicine.202 The ADMM-Plus 
conducted the first series of exercises in 2013-2014.203 The exercises consist “of HA/ 
DR, military medicine, counter-terrorism and maritime security,” organized in several 
ADMM-Plus countries: Brunei Darussalam (HADR/ Military Medicine Exercise), 
Indonesia (Counter-Terrorism Exercise/ CTX), Australia (Maritime Security Field 
Training Exercise), and the Philippines (Peacekeeping Operations Table-Top 
Exercise).204 Like in the ARF activities, the ADMM-Plus exercises also enhance the 
interaction among member countries through discussion, cooperation, and expertise 
sharing.205 Although the gathering usually avoids the South China Sea issues in the 
discussion, the ADMM-Plus facilitates venue for the claimant countries to cooperate and 
build constructive relationships. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although there are some maritime multinational cooperation organizations in the 
Asia-Pacific region, their impact on the prevention of escalation—especially in the South 
China Sea disputes—remains limited. Those cooperation have limited membership, such 
as navy-to-navy in the WPNS, military-to-military in the ADMM-Plus, and coast guard-
to-coast guard in the NPCGF, or scope, such as sea robbery and piracy in ReCAAP, and 
HA/DR in the ARF. On the other hand, the WPNS members’ acceptance of CUES is a 
signal that there is a chance to adopt a multilateral conflict management approach to the 
South China Sea disputes. It is also a step toward discussing the possibility of including 
regional civilian maritime agencies in future cooperation. 
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IV. PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 
This chapter provides an overview of Vietnam’s and the Philippines’ claims to the 
South China Sea and their relations with other claimant countries, as well as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. This chapter also presents 
evidence of the increasing conflict between the South China Sea claimant countries’ 
civilian maritime forces. In addition, there are two brief case studies showing how some 
countries employ their maritime agencies in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
As previously mentioned, the South China Sea has enormous hydrocarbon 
reserves in the form of oil and gas, although estimates vary because no comprehensive 
exploration has been undertaken in the disputed areas to date. The South China Sea is 
also abundant in fisheries potential, providing 10% of the world demand; however, fish 
stocks in the littoral states have been depleted due to overfishing.206 Naturally, the 
fishermen have shifted their fishing grounds to the disputed area in the South China Sea. 
Consequently, the need to secure energy sources and to feed the growing population has 
raised the tension in the disputed areas recently.  
Apart from its resources, the South China Sea is strategically located in the 
intertwined busy Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and Sea Lanes of Oil Trade 
(SLOT) which carry about half of the world’s shipping by tonnage annually.207 Andrew 
S. Erickson points out that  
the South China Sea handles an annual oil flow three times that of the 
Suez Canal and 15 time that of the Panama Canal. By 2020, increasing 
regional energy demand is expected to double its oil figures. [It] is [also] a 
206 Clarence J. Bouchat, The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China 
Sea (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 6. 
207 Hong Nong, “Maritime Trade Development in Asia: A Need for Regional Maritime Security 
Cooperation in the South China Sea,” in Maritime Security in the South China Sea, eds. Shicun Wu and 
Keyuan Zou (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 42. 
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vital transport corridor for liquefied natural gas (LNG), carrying two-third 
of the world’s current LNG trade.208  
Any escalation will disrupt other sea users, not only the parties of the conflict. The 
shipping insurance cost will rise significantly if the area is unsafe for normal navigation 
and declared war-risk area.209 Re-routing ships via alternative routes, in order to avoid 
the conflict waters, also will the increase the cost.  
During the 25th ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in November 2014, among other 
matters discussed, the ASEAN leaders and their counterparts from ASEAN Dialogue 
Partners agreed to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes.210 The 2014 
ASEAN Summit was particularly important because it conducted just before the 
implementation of the ASEAN Community in 2015.211 The meeting sought to resolve the 
differences among members, including the South China Sea issues.  
While ASEAN has been trying to act as a mediator to solve the disputes in the 
South China Sea, it has persistent difficulties: some of the ASEAN countries such as 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are the claimant countries. Consequently, 
China has been reluctant to follow up the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) of Parties in the 
South China Sea into a more binding Code of Conduct (CoC).212 When China tried to 
move an oil rig into the disputed area in 2014, not only did it incite skirmishes at sea, it 
208 Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea Region,” in Maritime 
Security in the South China Sea, eds. Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 52. 
209 Xu Ke, “Myth and Reality: The Rise and Fall of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in the South 
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Ashgate, 2009), 89.  
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Secretariat News, November 12, 2014, http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-
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also sparked widespread violent protests in Vietnam.213 In view of the importance of the 
peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes, the ASEAN Secretary General Le 
Luong Minh shared his belief that “the South China Sea issue is not just about competing 
claims; it’s about peace and stability in the region.”214  
On the other hand, the increasing interest of non–claimant countries in direct 
intervention in the South China Sea would complicate the resolution of the disputes. At 
least three countries—India, Japan, and United Kingdom—already pronounce their 
intention to increase or send their respective navy to the area. The Indian Navy (IN) Chief 
of Naval Staff, Admiral Rabindra Kumar Dhowan, expressed his intention to increase the 
IN activities in the South China Sea, as a form to challenge China’s claim in the area.215 
Since India is not a claimant country of the South China Sea, the reason behind this move 
is not very clear. However, India has been wary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) intensifying operations in the Indian Ocean, and may try to foster more 
cooperation with China’s rival in the region, such as Vietnam, in which India also has off 
shore energy cooperation.  
In the case of Japan, its Defense Minister, General Nakatani announced to the 
press that the its military is interested in conducting maritime patrols in the disputed 
waters because the situation in the South China Sea would have implications for Japan’s 
national security.216 Japan may use this move to enhance its maritime cooperation with 
the Philippines and Vietnam, which already have received ships and equipment from the 
Japan Coast Guard (JCG), in view of the increasing Chinese activity in the East China 
Sea.  
213 Kate Hodal and Jonathan Kaiman, “At least 21 dead in Vietnam anti-China protests over oil rig,” 
The Guardian, May 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anti-china-
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http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-
china_sea_InfoGuide.  
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Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has been increasing its “political and economic 
interest in the Asia-Pacific region.”217 The United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Phillip 
Hammond pledges to support its allies in the event of escalation in the South China 
Sea.218 The country has a defense pact with “Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Singapore,” known as the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).219 His statement 
could be interpreted as meaning the United Kingdom will stand behind Malaysia in the 
South China Sea disputes. Jane’s notes that the United Kingdom’s commerce traversing 
the area per year is valued USD 4.52 trillion.220 The Royal Navy (RN) ships have been 
deployed to the area recently to participate in the search and rescue (SAR) of the 
Malaysian aircraft MH370 and the relief efforts in the Philippines following the Haiyan 
typhoon.221 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE CLAIMS 
With the spirit of providing prosperity for mankind and preservation of maritime 
environment, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides 
a legal basis for the extension of the jurisdiction of maritime countries through new sea 
regimes: the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf.  
However, Clarence J. Bouchat points out that the UNCLOS indirectly encourages 
littoral countries to assert their claim in the South China Sea.222 Indeed, more claimant 
countries tried to assert their claim by military occupation to various land features in the 
South China Sea since UNCLOS signed in 1982. It is important to note that only few 
land features in the South China Sea fall into the category of an island and can generate 
legal consequences according to UNCLOS. In addition, there have been clashes among 
almost all claimant countries in the disputed areas. 
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The U-shape Nine Dash Line that both Taiwan and China presented are often 
considered the Chinese claim because they are identical, although their positions are 
vague and there are huge gaps between lines.223 China and Taiwan based their claims on 
historical evidence, but neither country has effectively and continuously occupied the 
area, since only few islands can naturally support habitation. Taiwan occupied Woody 
Island in 1946 and the largest one, Taiping Island, in 1956.224 Other countries then 
followed to occupy islands and land features in the South China Sea, except for Brunei, 
which only claims the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ).  
The more rapid industrial and population growth in China, compared to other 
claimants, push the country to aggressively assert its claim. In addition, China needs to 
secure alternative energy sources other than from Middle East and West Africa. The 
growing capability and activities of the Indian Navy, and historical rivalries between the 
two countries, make China’s Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean 
more vulnerable to disruption. Therefore, securing the energy resources in the South 
China Sea is a logical solution. Currently China develops artificial islands on the reefs it 
occupies in order to support the habitation and possibly to build airstrips, such as in the 
Johnson South and Gaven Reefs.225 However, according to UNCLOS, countries cannot 
claim Territorial Sea, EEZ, and/ or Continental Shelf extending from artificial islands.226  
Vietnam continues occupation by the then Republic of South Vietnam. China and 
Vietnam have reached some joint development agreements in the Gulf of Tonkin; 
however, both countries have not settled their disputes in the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
yet.227 While Vietnam also has an overlapping claim with the Philippines in the Spratly 
223 Ramses Amer, “Claims and Conflict Situations,” in War or Peace in the South China Sea? 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002), 29. 
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Islands, in 2011 both countries agreed to sign a maritime cooperation agreement against 
China’s increasing activities in the South China Sea.228 The members of the Vietnam 
People’s Navy (VPN) and the Philippines Navy (PN) started an annual sport gathering at 
the Southwest Cay Island from mid-2014, a move that not only for strengthened their 
relationship in regard of China but also marked a step toward acknowledgement of 
respective countries’ claim over the South China Sea.229 
The Philippines’ claims of the South China Sea are a mix of historical and 
UNCLOS approaches. It is an extension of its territorial waters claim based on the 1898 
Paris Treaty.230 However, the irregular polygon lines consisting of up to 285 nautical 
miles in the South China Sea are inconsistent with the territorial waters determined by 
UNCLOS.231 In 2013 the Philippines submitted its dispute with China in the South China 
Sea to the U.N. Arbitral Tribunal.232 In addition, the Philippines also has territorial claim 
over land in Borneo currently administered by Malaysia, which could expand the 
Philippines’ maritime jurisdiction. However, besides the latest incident of an armed 
group’s incursion from Sulu into the disputed land in Borneo, the situation remain calm 
and in the status quo.  
Despite the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) adopted by all ASEAN 
members, there are still difficulties. The most serious incident between ASEAN member 
claimants probably was in the Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef in 1999, which are 
228 Ibid., 1031. 
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claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, when Malaysia sent its military to seize the land 
features and clashed with the Philippine troops.233  
Indonesia is a country that formally doesn’t have any claim over the South China 
Sea, but its EEZ in the Natuna Sea is intersecting with the Nine Dash Line. 234 Not 
surprisingly, there were some incidents between Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries with the Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement patrol vessels in the area.235 
The latest case was in March 2013 when the Chinese demanded the release of their 
fishing boats apprehended by the Indonesian.236  
In response to those incidents, the Indonesian Armed Forces have increased their 
overall military strength in the Natuna Islands and naval presence in surrounding 
waters.237 However, any incidents at the sea tend to be unreported because until now, 
both the government of Indonesia and China maintain that there is no territorial dispute 
between them.238 If the situation on the ground persists, it is not impossible in the near 
future that Indonesia will abandon its neutrality in the mediation role and join other South 
China Sea claimant countries against China.239 
C. TREND OF SKIRMISHES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTED 
AREAS 
All countries, except for Brunei, deploy and build military posts in the disputed 
South China Sea in order to assert their claim. Vietnam occupies the most with twenty-
nine garrisons and the Philippines in the second with ten; the rest islands and features 
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occupied by Malaysia (three), PRC (seven), and Taiwan (one), all but PRC has 
airstrips.240 The militarized maritime disputes over the South China Sea are prone to 
escalate into open arms conflict among claimants.241  
The signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 
or known as DoC, on November 4, 2002, minimized clashes between military units from 
claimant countries in the disputed areas.242 However, it did not prevent countries from 
utilizing non-military units in the troubled waters and clashes still occur (see Table 5). 
240 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange, “Pandora’s Sandbox China’s Island-Building Strategy in 
the South China Sea,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141632/
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Table 5.   List of Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea after 
DoC Signing in 2002 
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To summarize, the following graphics (Figures 6, 7, and 8) elaborate those 
chronological events depicted in Table 5 into the agencies and countries involved, and 
causes of the skirmishes. 
 
Figure 6.  Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea According to 
Agencies Involved 
Figure 6 indicates the trend that the South China Sea claimant countries 
increasingly employ their civilian maritime agencies in the disputed waters. There are 
increasing skirmishes between civilian maritime agencies, while there are tendencies of 
diminishing military direct involvement. Furthermore, although there was an attempt by 
China to move an oil rig to area in the 2014, the chart shows that skirmishes were 
255 “Vietnam Boat Sinks after Collision with Chinese Vessel,” BBC News, last updated May 27, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27583564.  
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actually lower than previous period. 257  However, it is likely that the actual incidents are 
higher than listed above, because some of the clashes are not reported or downplayed. 
 
Figure 7.  Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea According to 
Countries Involved  
Figure 7 shows that Indonesia and the United States also get involved in the 
skirmishes. It means that the disputes are not only influenced the South China Sea 
claimant countries, but others are affected as well. It is also interesting to note that 
Malaysia and Brunei, at least after the signing of DoC in 2002, Table 5 shows that both 
countries never engaged other claimants by their maritime forces in the South China Sea. 
The relatively farther distance of both countries to China than to the Philippines and 
Vietnam may contribute to this fact. Nevertheless, there are more skirmishes that 
involving China, the Philippines, and Vietnam than other countries. Unsurprisingly, being 
the most active in asserting its claim in the South China Sea, China is contributed to the 
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Figure 8.  Skirmishes Related to Disputes in South China Sea According to 
Reasons   
Figure 8 reveals that most of the skirmishes are related to fisheries. Petroleum 
companies tend to avoid the disputed areas in the South China Sea; except for a brief 
moment when China tried to bring its oil rig in the disputed areas with Vietnam in 
2014.258 However, the need to find new source of food is more pressing than the oil and 
gas, given the regional growth of population and overfishing in littoral countries.  
The increasing trend of various civilian maritime agencies employment in the 
South China Sea actually works as a preventive measure to avoid a direct military to 
military engagement. However, with little coordination and control over those agencies, it 
may be counterproductive in reality and sparks more incidents.  
D. CASE STUDIES 
From all the chronological incidents in the South China Sea listed in the Table 5, 
two major incidents—the Scarborough Reef in 2012 and Paracel Oil rig standoff in 
2014—will be explained further in this section. Both incidents show the increasing 
employment of the civilian maritime agencies by claimant countries on asserting their 
maritime claim, replacing the Navy in the forefront. The actual intentions to employ the 
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civilian maritime agencies are to avoid escalation by displaying benign posture and to 
downplay the disputes as domestic maritime law enforcements matters only. However, 
over reliance on those agencies may backfire because of factors explained in the Chapter 
II: there is limited cooperation between respective country’s civilian and military 
maritime agencies. If the situation escalates because of the civilian maritime agencies’ 
aggressive action, navies may intervene and the situation will likely escalate even more.  
1. The Scarborough Reef Standoff in 2012 
The Scarborough Reef (known as Panatag Reef or Shoal to the Philippines, see 
Figure 9) is located around 100 nautical miles from Luzon, Philippine. It is claimed by 
China, the Philippines, and Taiwan (since Taiwan and China claim are identical). On 
April 8, 2012, the Philippine Navy (PN) new flagship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was 
deployed in the area. The ship encountered eight China flagged fishing boats in the area 
that claimed by the Philippines. The PN ship then tried to apprehend the fishermen and 
their boats, however, two “China Marine Surveillance Vessels (CMS) Zhonggou Haijian 
75 and Zhonggou Haijian 84” arrived at the scene and interfere. China’s civilian 
maritime agency ships positioned themselves between the PN frigate and the fishing 
boats in order to prevent capture of the latter. Unable to exercise more action, there was a 
stalemate. Both sides still insisted on their own rights over Scarborough Reef. While the 
government of China protested to the Philippines authority regarding the PN threat to 
their fishermen in the area claimed by China, another CMS vessel came to the area and 
make situation tenser. The standoff ended when the PN frigate leave the area and return 
to base for replenishment. Later, a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship was sent to replace 
the PN ship.259 
259 “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia, last update September 
1, 2014, 4, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305082. 
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Figure 9.  The Scarborough Reef260 
Although the China CMS vessels are under civilian agencies, the Philippines later 
accused China of escalating the situation by sending more ships. However, by employing 
civilian ships instead of those belonging to the PLAN, according to Trefor Moss, China 
managed to avoid being seen as bullying smaller countries.261 During the standoff, there 
were no PLAN ships seen in the vicinity. The situation may have had a different results if 
both countries had deployed their naval vessels to the area. It is still not clear what would 
have happened if the PN ship had continued with its intention to seize the Chinese 
fishermen and their boat; what the CMS ships would do and whether the PLAN would 
called to the scene. The Philippine decision to withdraw its naval vessel and send a coast 
guard vessel can also be seen as an attempt to deescalate the situation. Nevertheless, 
260 O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: 
Issues for Congress,” 3. 
261 Trefor Moss, “China’s other navies,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 40, Issue 28 (July 11, 2012), 29; 
Martinson, “Power to the Provinces,” 28. 
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some analysts suggest that it may not have been the real reason for withdrawing the ship, 
because they noticed that the PN ship likely had technical problems.262 
2. The Oil Rig Incident in 2014 
On May 5, 2014, Vietnam claimed that the China’s National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) oilrig was within its EEZ (see Figure 10).263 Around 80 ships, 
comprised of navy and civilian maritime agencies vessels, as well as fishing boats, 
escorted China’s oilrig, according to Vietnamese media.264 Vietnam filed protests to 
China about the incident and fierce demonstrations erupted, calling for tougher 
government stance against China’s claim and resulting in fatalities of some Chinese 
national reside in Vietnam.265 At sea, the situation was also tense. Vietnam tried to 
hamper the oilrig with any means, utilizing the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) and fishing 
boats.266 As China resorted to the same tactics, there were numerous incidents of 
ramming, hitting, and exchanging of water cannon spray by both sides, resulting in at 
least one Vietnamese fishing vessel being sunk.267 The incident ended when China 
withdrew its oilrig toward Hainan Island, reasoning that the oil rig’s main mission to 
discover oil and gas has been accomplished.268  
262 “Navy, Philippines,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, Ibid. 
263 Ridzwan Rahmat, “China and Vietnam square off in SCS over oil rig,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 51, 
Issue 20 (May 14, 2014), 16. 
264 “Navy, Vietnam,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, last posted October 8, 
2014, 4, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1305175.  
265 Hodal and Kaiman, “At least 21 dead in Vietnam anti-China protests over oil rig.”  
266 Rahmat, “China and Vietnam square off in SCS over oil rig.”  
267 Ibid.; “Vietnam boat sinks after collision with Chinese vessel.”  
268 “China moves Vietnam row oil rig.” 
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Figure 10.  The Oilrig Incident269 
These incidents showed the employment of the civilian maritime assets by both 
China and Vietnam, not only the law enforcement agencies but also involving fishing 
boats. However, unlike the Scarborough Reef standoff where there were no PLAN ships 
around, in this case, the Navy ships did accompany the oilrig. Although the PLAN was 
never involved in the skirmishes, its presence indicates the preparation for escalation and 
also served as a deterrent. It reveals China’s concept of a layering strategy: the PLAN 
ships lay in the core, the civilian maritime agencies vessels stay in the next layer, and 
non-government boats are positioned in the periphery.  
E. EFFORTS TO MANAGE THE CONFLICT  
Recognizing the seriousness of the South China Sea disputes to the stability of the 
region, the ASEAN has been advocating a peaceful resolution for all parties involved. 
However, it is a delicate situation for ASEAN to maintain its neutrality and avoid 
conflicts of interest, because Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam all have 
269 Ibid.  
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claims over the South China Sea and are members of the organization too. No wonder 
China was very reluctant to resolve the disputes with ASEAN in the 1990s and favored 
bilateral discussion instead.270 In doing so, China hopes to avoid other claimant countries 
consolidating against it. It is also important to note that Taiwan is never included in the 
discussions with other claimant countries. Despite all the difficulties, ASEAN and China 
have reached some agreements regarding maritime security issues that include the South 
China Sea problems. This is evidence that all parties see the importance of peaceful 
resolution and there is still hope for negotiations. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is 
a specific forum that discusses the security issues in the region, including the South 
China Sea disputes, among ASEAN members and its dialogue partners. One of its 
accomplishments is the signing of DoC, which includes all parties in the South China Sea 
disputes, except Taiwan, in 2002 after a series of negotiations. Although the document 
states explicitly that it is not legally binding, the DoC is a step forward into more 
cooperation in the future to solve the South China Sea disputes.  
The more binding document, the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (CoC) 
is currently under negotiation; however, China still has some objections to the draft.271 
The reason for this is not very clear, but China may try to negotiate when it already has 
stronger stance in the South China Sea, as demonstrates in the buildup of artificial islands 
in Spratly.272 On the ASEAN side, there is a lot work to increase the organization 
cohesiveness regarding the CoC issue. In this view, the implementation of the ASEAN 
Community 2015 will have a good opportunity to foster the relationship among members 
of the organization. One of its pillars, the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) 
is promoting “peace and stability in the region, … cooperation under the TAC, … full 
implementation of the DOC for peace and stability in the South China Sea, … [and] 
Maritime Cooperation.”273 In order to develop a successful cooperation, the ARF has 
270 Stein Tønnesson, “The History of the Dispute,” War or Peace in the South China Sea? ed., Timo 
Kivimӓki (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002), 19. 
271 O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving 
China),” 10–11.  
272 Hardy and O’Connor, “China build another island in SCS,” Ibid. 
273 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, April 2009), 10–11, 
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf.  
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been working in a slowly but steady pace. Starting from the comfort level of all parties, 
the form of cooperation in the maritime security is the one that directly benefits the 
members, such as Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Typhoon Haiyan, 
which hit the Philippines in 2013, highlighted the actual and common threat to countries 
in the region; during the relief effort a lot of countries send their support to the 
Philippines government, including parties of the South China Sea disputes.274 This tragic 
event demonstrates the importance of stronger cooperation among all countries in the 
region.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The importance of the South China Sea as a strategic shipping lane has been 
increasing due to the economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. Shipping volume 
traversing the area has increased. The South China Sea also has abundant natural 
resources to fulfill the region’s rising demand of energy and food. With the claimant 
countries’ growing urgency to secure their claim in the South China Sea, it is likely that 
the probability of clashes has increased in the future. Although the South China Sea 
claimant countries have clashes with each other, the close proximity of the Philippines 
and Vietnam to China has contributed the greatest number of clashes. After the signing of 
DoC in 2002, the empirical data of the skirmishes in the South China Sea shows that the 
claimant countries tend to decrease the use of their military forces and increase the use of 
civilian maritime agency in the disputed areas.  
The 2012 Scarborough Reef and 2014 Paracel Oilrig incidents demonstrated that 
there are problems in the effectiveness of civilian and military maritime agency 
cooperation in the countries involved. Overall, Vietnam has more effective civilian and 
military maritime agency cooperation than the Philippines. During the 2012 Scarborough 
Reef standoff, the Philippines employed the PN ship instead of the PCG because there 
were inadequate resources available to assert the country’s maritime claim. While the PN 
frigate was better overall to do the job than the PCG ships, there was higher probability 
274 “Typhoon Haiyan: Aid in numbers,” BBC, last updated November 14, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-pacific-24899006.  
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of conflict if China had responded by sending the PLAN ships. On the other hand, 
throughout the 2014 Paracel Oilrig incidents, both Vietnam and China employed their 
civilian maritime agency and fishing boats in the forefront, and their navies in the 
vicinity. While the intention was to reduce the possibility of escalation, Vietnam had 
difficulties communicating with their own ships in the area to coordinate their action. 
Therefore, over reliance on the civilian maritime agency may also escalate the incidents 
between claimant countries in the disputed areas in the South China Sea. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD 
A. CONCLUSION 
There have been numerous high profile diplomatic talks among leaders in the 
region—both the claimant and non-claimant countries—to resolve the South China Sea 
disputes peacefully. However, because there are differences among the South China Sea 
claimant countries regarding the legal basis and national approach to the their claim, it 
seems that further negotiation from the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DoC) is still difficult. To make matters worse, even if the leaders from the 
claimant countries have agreed to a peaceful resolution in the South China Sea such as 
the DoC, the reality seems different in the disputed areas. There are continuing 
skirmishes among claimant countries’ military and/or civilian maritime agencies in the 
South China Sea.  
Since the South China Sea is also an important waterway for regional and 
international shipping, any escalation in the disputed waters would affect other countries 
in the region as well. In the highly militarized disputed areas such as the South China 
Sea, any skirmishes may escalate into unintentional open conflict among the claimant 
countries. The possible conflict may become even worse by dragging other countries into 
the hostilities, especially for those who have a defense agreement with the claimant 
countries of the South China Sea. Malaysia, one of the claimant countries, is part of the 
Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), a defense cooperation that also consists of 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. Another claimant, the 
Philippines, has a defense treaty with the United States. Further likely effects to non-
claimant countries in the region are—but limited to—the rising price of shipping 
insurance, the increasing cost of shipping due to longer routes in order to avoid the 
conflict zone, and other economy consequences. 
Focusing on the reasons for persistent incidents rather than legal issues of who the 
legitimate owners of the disputed waters are, this thesis reveals that there are similar 
problems among the claimant countries. Both the Philippines and Vietnam, countries 
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compared in this thesis, share the same problems in their civilian and military cooperation 
in the maritime realm. It turns out that there is a mix of military and civilian maritime 
agencies deployed in the South China Sea in order to assert the respective countries’ 
claims over the area. In general, there is a lack of coordination and cooperation between 
the military and civilian maritime agencies in each country, let alone among the claimant 
countries. In addition, although not a focus in this thesis, China is included in the 
comparison because of its close proximity to the Philippines and Vietnam and 
assertiveness to the South China Sea claim. China is also in the forefront of employing 
civilian maritime agencies in the disputed waters in the South China Sea, compared to 
other claimant countries.  
This thesis’s comparison of the effectiveness of the cooperation of the military 
and civilian maritime agencies reveals that there are common problems in all three of its 
components: plan; interagency institutions, structure, and process; and resources. First, 
there are inadequate plans regarding the cooperation of the military and civilian maritime 
agencies in each of three countries discussed. Most of the doctrines, regulations, white 
papers, and other documents are institution-centric and do not provide enough measures 
to indicate how the cooperation of the military and civilian maritime agencies should be 
performed. However, the root of this problem varies. The Philippines tends to have over 
optimistic plans with very limited resources available to implement it. On the other hand, 
since in Vietnam the military still dominates many of the non-military aspects, the roles 
of the civilian agencies are minimal. In China, the problem arises mainly from the various 
civilian maritime agencies—the Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (MLEs)—that 
operate under different authorities stretching from the central government to the coastal 
provinces, rather than the military and civilian maritime agency cooperation per se.  
Second, there is an insufficient level of cooperation among military and civilian 
maritime agencies in all of the three countries. Theoretically, cooperation can still exist 
among agencies even if there is no adequate plan available to become a guide. However, 
facing the limitation of available resources, the Philippine Navy (PN) still dominates the 
maritime security operations in the Philippines. In many cases, other maritime agencies 
have to rely on the PN in performing their own roles. In Vietnam, the fact that the 
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Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) is still under the Ministry of National Defense (MND) 
actually provides better cooperation among the military and civilian maritime agencies 
than the Philippines, although the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) seems more dominant 
than its civilian counterparts do. In addition, given the influence of the military in 
Vietnam, it is likely that the vessels under the Directorate of Fisheries operate under the 
control of the VPN to some degree. In contrast, China employs almost exclusively its 
MLEs in the South China Sea, with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
monitoring from the distance. The 2014 oil rig incident revealed to the international 
public the layered strategy adopted by the Chinese; the PLAN at the rear nearby to the 
oilrig, the MLEs stationed in the outer layer, and fishing boats at the forefront. The main 
problems for the China are integrating its various MLEs into an effective maritime force 
and eliminating rivalries among themselves. 
Third, regarding the resources category, it seems that the Philippines’ inadequate 
funding for its maritime security may impede further effective military and civilian 
maritime cooperation. The implication is that the Philippines will likely internationalize 
the South China Sea disputes—which will irritate China more and make difficult the 
negotiation of the further implementation of the DoC. In contrast, Vietnam’s civilian 
maritime agencies received more funds than the Navy in developing their capabilities. 
The VCG is rapidly expanding its assets and it is likely that it will become operationally 
independent from the VPN in the near future. This implies that Vietnam may employ 
more of its civilian maritime agencies in the South China Sea in dealing with the China’s 
MLEs. The Chinese MLEs, on the other hand, are likely to be more independent from the 
PLAN’s support. The growing MLEs are not only surpassing other claimant countries in 
number, but also in the size of vessels. Although Chinese MLE ships are lightly armed or 
unarmed, their bigger size means that those vessels have more endurance. China will 
likely continue its current practice in employing MLEs in the disputed waters of the 
South China Sea.  
The empirical data reveals the trend of the decreasing military forces involvement 
in the clashes in the South China Sea and the increasing contribution of the civilian 
maritime agency in skirmishes in the disputed areas. With the growing need for the 
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alternative sources of energy and food, there is a rising pressure for the claimant 
countries to secure their claim in the South China Sea. This situation will likely to 
increase the probability of clashes in the future and may escalate into conflict. Since 
China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have contributed to most of clashes, the probabilities 
of escalation are higher for those three countries. The 2012 Scarborough Reef and 2014 
Paracel Oilrig incidents showed the challenges faced by the countries involved in the 
incidents in conducting effective civilian and military maritime agency cooperation. In 
both cases, while there were some attempts to reduce the possibility of escalation by 
employing civilian maritime agencies, the results were lessened by each country’s 
ineffectiveness in coordinating its own multi maritime agencies. Thus, over reliance on 
the civilian maritime agency may have negative effect for the de-escalation efforts. 
Therefore, there is a need to address the issues of civilian and military maritime agency 
cooperation in each country discussed in order to lower the probability of conflict among 
the South China Sea claimant countries. In other words, until civil–military relations are 
improved domestically, conflict will, admittedly, continue to threaten the South China 
Sea. 
At the international level, surprisingly, no military and civilian maritime agencies 
cooperation exists. Although there is some maritime multinational cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific region, they are limited in the membership and scope. The Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS), the biggest maritime cooperation in the region with 21 
members and 5 observers, is limited its membership to navy only. Although the WPNS 
has been done well with the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), a set of 
guidelines for members of the organization to prevent incidents at sea, the document does 
not include the civilian maritime agencies and it only applies on the high seas. The formal 
organization of the Southeast Asia countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), has been working to reduce the tension in the South China Sea and resolve the 
disputes peacefully. However, because some of the South China Sea claimant countries—
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—are also ASEAN members, the 
impartiality of the organization is often under question. Currently, there are two forms of 
security cooperation under the ASEAN: the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
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(ADMM), as well as the ADMM Plus, which includes eight ASEAN dialogue partners, 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The South China Sea issues have become one 
of the topic of discussions in those organizations meetings. While the ADMM Plus 
covers wide ranging defense and security cooperation, to date the organization has 
focused more on the counter terrorism cooperation among member countries. On the 
other hand, while the ARF interest encompassing a wide ranging security-related topics 
from the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) to cyber security, the 
level of cooperation has just been expanded from meetings and workshops into HA/DR 
themed exercises. Looking at the ASEAN’s practice of conducting diplomacy, it is likely 
that those organizations seek to work from the comfort level where all the parties agree to 
collaborate and gradually increase the level of cooperation. Consequently, it may take 
some time before every claimant country is willing to include the South China Sea 
cooperation in the agenda. Other cooperation, such as the North Pacific Coast Guard 
Forum (NPCGF) and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) are multinational civilian maritime 
agencies cooperation. Furthermore, their cooperation is limited to the maritime security 
and safety only.  
Although there are various initial motives for claiming land features and waters 
surrounding them, there is a growing tendency to control the South China Sea because of 
its resources. The regional economy and population—including the claimant countries—
lead to the increasing need for energy and food sources, all available in the South China 
Sea abundantly. Analysis on the South China Sea skirmishes after the DoC signing in 
2002 shows that most incidents are related to the disputes over resources: fisheries and 
energy. Interestingly, the clashes are not limited only to the claimant countries, but to 
others as well. It may indicate the increasing desperation of the claimant countries to 
secure their resources from the South China Sea. The analysis also reveals that civilian 
maritime agencies are involved in most of the clashes, compared to a common perception 
of the military-to-military clashes in the South China Sea disputed area. It indicates that 
actually more countries are willing to lower the probability of escalation by employing 
their civilian maritime agencies instead of the military. However, over reliance and 
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aggressive use of those civilian maritime agencies may provoke escalation of the 
disputes. 
B. THE WAY AHEAD 
This thesis has identified that ineffective military and civilian maritime agencies 
cooperation—domestically and internationally—contributes to the persistent clashes 
among claimant country maritime agencies in the South China Sea disputed area. It 
would be easier to resolve the problems now, because it will be more difficult in the 
future when all the claimant countries have more stakes in the disputed area, for example, 
when they begin to extract the hydrocarbon reserves and develop their garrison in the 
South China Sea. Contrary to other conflict resolutions that are based on the legal basis of 
each country’s claims in the disputed area, promoting effective regional military and 
civilian maritime agencies cooperation to prevent the escalation may have a better 
chance. It should limit the cooperation into creating a new norm of de-escalation 
measures only, and avoid talking about the disputes itself. It is also preferable that all the 
claimant countries have major roles in the efforts.  
Since there is very limited interaction among military and civilian maritime 
agencies in current maritime security-related organizations, there is a need to incorporate 
all maritime stakeholders—both the military and civilian agencies—in one multilateral 
forum. The level of interaction may increase gradually but in steady steps based on the 
comfort level of all participants. Those interactions may be in various forms, such as 
seminars, workshops, personnel exchanges, exercises, sport activities, and so on. The 
intention is to promote cooperation and confidence building measures among military 
and civilian maritime agencies in the multilateral forum. In due course, the military and 
civilian maritime agencies multilateral cooperation forum would influence individual 
countries in addressing their own domestic cooperation problems. Eventually, the 
multilateral forum may possibly adopt the CUES style document in preventing incidents 
at sea among their maritime assets. Yet, what kind of forum this will be and how to bring 
all maritime stakeholders in the multilateral cooperation are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, and will therefore require further investigation.  
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